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CURIOUS CHIASMA: RISING AND FALLING PROTECTION OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GENDER EQUALITY
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.*
My thesis is a simple one. Both religious freedom and gender
equality deserve serious protection against official state action. The
reasons for doing so run deep in American history. In many ways, re-
ligious freedom has defined the American experience from the dawn
of the republic.' To treat it dismissively or with the contempt heaped
upon it recently by the judiciary is profoundly discontinuous with the
historic customs and traditions of this country. I offer reasons sup-
porting this claim in Part I below.
By contrast, equal treatment of men and women before the law
was not something readily agreed upon at the outset. On the con-
trary, the inclusion of women in the full fabric of the American life
has been achieved only through an enormous struggle centuries in
the making.2 In Part II, I illustrate the difficulty of that struggle from
the founding period to the present, with illustrations of classifications
based on gender that lack a plausible rational basis. Genderjustice is
still a difficult goal to achieve, but to turn the clock back now on the
process of achieving it should be unthinkable. In the terms of this
Symposium, the exclusion of women from participation in public
life-through disenfranchisement and exclusion from obligations of
citizenship, including service in public office and service on juries,
where the people decide the application of general norms to particu-
lar facts-resulted in the enactment of discriminatory legislation
passed without adequate representation of women. Because legisla-
tion of this sort was flawed at the very core of democratic self-
governance, I argue that it never had a plausible rational basis, and
surely cannot be said to have one now.
. Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I would like to express my gratitude
to my colleagues Laura Gaston Dooley, Marie Failinger, Dolores Warwick Frese, Mary Ann
Glendon, Sarah Barringer Gordon, Linda K. Kerber, Rosalie Levinson, JoEllen Lind, Aine
O'Healy, and Kim Lane Scheppele for helpful comments on an early draft of this article.
' See, e.g.,JOHN T. NOONAN,JR., THE LuSTRE OF OUR CouNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998) (tracing the history, problems, and influences of religious free-
dom in America).
2See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting
Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 103 (1994) (looking at the voting rights of women historically and
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I began this Article with a claim that my thesis is simple. Since
nothing ever is, I will now admit that, no matter how simple I think
my thesis is, some would find it controversial. I acknowledge this fact
at the outset and simply add that I do not want to spend the limited
space of this Article refuting those who hold a contrary view. For ex-
ample, there are some religious believers who still think that male
domination and female submission are divinely ordained and that le-
gal arguments that challenge these arrangements or cultural predi-
cates are suspect. There are those who are convinced that religion is
coterminous with patriarchy or, worse yet, misogyny. I am not going
to elaborate on either of these positions in this Article. Instead, I
leave those who have espoused them.
Even if some would challenge my thesis, it is at least worthy of dis-
cussion in a Symposium that explores the utility of the rational basis
test in equal protection jurisprudence. If some imagine that religion
and gender justice are diametrically opposed to one another, it is at
least equally plausible that our society must rigorously protect both of
these important societal values, which are neither coterminous nor
mutually exclusive. Both of these values have been conjoined histori-
cally in significant ways. For example, the feminists of the nineteenth
century grounded many of their claims for equal dignity as persons in
religious discourse.
To restate my theme in the terms of this Symposium, it is irra-
tional to leave free exercise of religion and gender equality vulner-
able to arbitrary and capricious behavior by governmental actors.
There is no good reason to do that in our constitutional culture. On
a formal level, of course, rational basis analysis-the lowest level of
judicial scrutiny of the policies and practices of the political
branches-is meant to eradicate or at least interrogate such behavior.
Thus, to demand a rational basis for a policy should normally be a
way of eliminating the arbitrary, which by definition is irrational. Yet
unreasonable practices-ones that no reasonable person could de-
fend with sound reasons-have routinely been sustained when the
standard invoked in constitutional analysis is the so-called rational ba-
sis test. A sad example of such irrationality in the context of gender
discrimination was the diminution of the role of women injury delib-
erations that the Court deemed permissible a half century ago in Hoyt
v. F/orida.3 Why? So that "they" could have our meals ready when
"we" get home from work. Who is the "we" in that rationale? Men, of
course, assumed in this rationale to be the only ones in the
workforce. Is that rationale rational or simply a shoddy example of
irrationality?
The news on rational basis is not, however, all bleak. In Part I of
this Article, I explore cases in which policies that discriminated
3 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding state law providing that women could not be on ajury un-
less they volunteered).
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against women were invalidated on the ground of their irrationality.
In one of the most influential articles on constitutional law of the past
century,4 Professor Gerald Gunther coined the wonderful phrase "ra-
tionality with a bite" to describe the cases that produced the result,
discussed in Part II, in which gender equality is at a high point.' If
the formal language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gen-
der discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very close to
that sort of exacting review. It rarely meets a classification that it
likes.
I explore in Part I several cases illustrating differing standards for
protecting the first of our civil liberties, religious freedom. In 1963
the Court issued a powerful pronouncement that free exercise was to
be given the highest level of judicial protection.6 By the end of the
century the retreat from this position was virtually complete. Without
briefing or argument, the Court announced in 1990 that free exer-
cise was a constitutional redundancy, or worse, an abandoned step-
child. Thoughtless violations of free exercise now occur in our re-
public that would have been unthinkable two decades ago, when the
erosion of free exercise protection began. Employing Gunther's
categories, I will describe this level ofjudicial scrutiny in the 1980s as
strict in theory but toothless in fact, and the judicial approach of the
1990s as a rational basis test that tolerates a wide swath of irrational-
ity.
Some would find my juxtaposition of religious freedom and gen-
der justice curious. The normative vision that both religious freedom
and genderjustice merit the highest level of constitutional protection
is, to understate matters, not currently descriptive of how the Consti-
tution is currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. To explain
how this came to pass, I invoke a literary device known as chiasmus,
in which the pattern is ABBA. Tracing the falling movement from
high to low and the rising movement from low to high describes the
formation of an "X," in Greek the letter "chi." Hence the device was
called a chiasmus. From Sherbert v. Verers to City of Boerne v. Flores,9
the movement in the protection of free exercise of religion has been
from high to low, from strict scrutiny to toothless irrationality. I trace
' Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Cour 1971 Tern-Foreword: In Search of EvolvingDoctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
5 Id. at 12.
6 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding invalid South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act, which prohibited claimants from receiving funds if they turned down suit-
able work without "good cause" because it abridged claimant's free exercise right not to work
on her Sabbath day).
See Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that
Free Exercise Clause did not require granting unemployment compensation to discharged em-
ployees, where employees were fired for ingesting peyote as part of a religious ceremony).
8 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 unconstitu-
tional because it exceeded Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
[Vol. 4:2
CURIOUS CH1ASMA
this shift in Part I. From Hoyt v. Florid ° to United States v. Virginia,"
the movement in the protection of gender equality has been from
low to high, from toothless irrationality to de facto strict scrutiny. I
trace this shift in Part II.
To describe this chiasma as curious is to make a normative claim
that the current doctrinal posture of the Court is unfortunate. I ar-
gue this position in Part III. We should not denigrate one value at
the expense of the other, for two reasons. First, religious freedom
and gender equality are both grounded in the dignity of the human
person. Second, these values have not typically been viewed in our
history as opposites that cancel one another out. There may be occa-
sions when a claim of religious exercise is juxtaposed with a claim for
gender equality in such a way that the government must resolve a
dispute one way or another. But this binary option is usually unnec-
essary, especially when fine minds seek alternative resolution of their
differences relating to religion and gender.
I offer two examples of interactions between religion and gender.
I begin with a policy proposal based on a hypothetical situation or
thought experiment designed to test the limits of religious freedom
on the theory that in such conflicts the nation's commitment to gen-
der equality should trump free exercise of religion. Specifically, I
consider Professor Mary Becker's proposal to deny tax-exempt status
to religious communities that deny ordination to women.'2 I view the
proposal as a misplaced concern for gender equality that leads in the
direction of needlessly negating free exercise of religion at its very
core or center.
Then I discuss a controversy over religion and homosexuality.
This controversy cannot be resolved in a pluralistic society by silenc-
ing one view or the other, but the particular episode I discuss can il-
lustrate the need for restraint in the way that claims are presented.
In 1989 ACT UP!, an AIDS rights organization, staged a protest
against Catholic teaching on sexuality. Such an event would not
normally be considered news, but the location of the protest-inside
Saint Patrick's Cathedral-and its timing during worship services led
even a famously liberal newspaper like the New York Times to editorial-
ize against the demonstration. The same reasons for rejecting Pro-
fessor Becker's proposal lead me to conclude that this argument for
10 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (denying equal protection claim based on the theory that an all-male
jury was unconstitutionally selected under Florida'sjury service statute).
' 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that Virginia Military Institute's male-only admission policy
denied equal protection to women and was, as such, unconstitutional).
" Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1992) (showing how the Bill of Rights favors men).
" Jason DeParle, 111 Held in St. Patrick's AIDS Protes N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989, at B3; The
Storming of St. Pat's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1989, atA24 (editorial). SeeEdward McGlynn Gaffney,
Hostility to Religion, American-Sle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 289-91 (1992) (reacting to the Times
editorial).
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gay rights was literally misplaced and could properly be withdrawn by
the police to Fifth Avenue or some other public forum.
Both of these examples suggest that in a world largely made up of
compromise, perfectly consistent conduct may be too much to ex-
pect. But in the difficult task of safeguarding constitutional liberties,
there may be some wisdom in returning to Aristotle's definition of
virtue as avoidance of extremes.1 4 That may seem like heresy to those
for whom the First Amendment Religion Clause or the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects a more absolute
commitment than the term "compromise" normally connotes. To il-
lustrate my point, I rely on Thomas Hardy's and I discuss a run-in be-
tween the Cincinnati Fire Department and a Lutheran church that
should have taken about ten minutes to settle if the wielders of abso-
lutes yielded to truly reasonable exploration of common interests.'
6
Reflection upon the foundations of religious freedom and gender
equality opens up the prospect of rediscovering broad common
ground between these two important values in our society. In light of
this common ground, I think that the chiasma in rising and falling
trajectories of constitutional care about religion and gender is not
normative, but irrational and thus unconstitutional.
I. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: FROM CARE TO APATHY
A. Antecedents and the Acme: From James Madison to Sherbert andYoder
Throughout this Article I rely on legal history as the primary
method of constructing my argument. I use history as a guide be-
cause I agree with Holmes that the life of the law has been experi-
ence rather than logic. 7 The Canadian philosopher Bernard Loner-
gan made a similar point when he illustrated that the recurrent
structure of human understanding proceeds generally from experi-
ence to insight or understanding of experience; from insight to
judgment of the truth or falsity of claims; and from judgment to deci-
sions that lead us back to experience.' Augustine and Aquinas made
similar arguments when they wrote of the connection between faith
and understanding in such a way as to include the nonrational, but to
exclude the irrational in the effort to comprehend or grasp that
which may be known. Blaise Pascal was moving in the same direction
when he wrote: "The heart has reasons which reason knows nothing
4 ARISTOTLE, NIcoMAcHEAN ETHIcS (Martin Oswald trans., Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
" See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text (citing THOMAS HARDY, FAR FROM THE
MADDING CROWD 41-42 (Harper & Row 1964) (1874)).
16 See infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
17 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 5 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been
logic but experience.").
I8 See BERNARDJ.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1970).
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of."' 9 The girls in Carol Gilligan's experiment in moral reasoning
seek a different angle of vision to avoid the binary choice they have
been given to puzzle over.2' And in a famous sequence in Charles
Schultz's "Peanuts," Charlie Brown is seated at his desk in school and
moves from exhilaration in a lofty insight that is quickly deflated to a
sense of the ordinary: "I know the answer! The answer lies within the
heart of all mankind! The answer is twelve? I think I'm in the wrong
building."
Applying these three streams of seemingly disparate thought-in
shorthand I will call them Holmes, Lonergan, and Charlie Brown-to
the subject of this Article leads me to three conclusions. First, from
Holmes we learn that it is sound to test the legitimacy of current
practices against the experience of the American people from the
founding period to the present. Second, from Lonergan's work on
historical consciousness we learn that it is a mistake to attempt to re-
trieve any of these periods as though they were golden eras that re-
solved contemporary issues without any intervening process of reflec-
tion.2' At each stage of the process, it helps to realize that texts do
not "speak" with authority, but are read and interpreted by humans,
often very fallibly. Recognition of this truism helps to avoid the twin
errors of anachronism-expecting answers before there was a ques-
tion-and determinism, or being bound by the circumstances of the
past in a rigid and inflexible manner that fails to appreciate the kind
of document we are reading. Third, from Charlie Brown we learn
that we are all capable of making mistakes by overlooking the obvi-
ous. I maintain that it should now be obvious that respect for differ-
ence is a way not simply of getting along, but also of attending to the
very difficult task of assigning reasons and then correcting them as
their deficiencies become apparent. Infallibility in the hands of a
bully leads to uniformity achieved through coercive power and domi-
nation. In constitutional terms this is called an established religion
or a violation of free exercise of religion. In gender discourse the
beast is usually called such things as male domination or patriarchy
or misogyny. In the terms of this Symposium, the beast can be any
official regulation that has no rational basis, that is just plain dumb,
or that is at least arbitrary or capricious in the sense that no serious
reason is offered to justify the assertion of power.
I begin with religious freedom because it is at the very heart of the
American experience in constitutionalism. The central idea is that
the government may not prefer one form of religious worship over
"BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 154 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin Books 1966) (1670).
' CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1993).
" See generally Lonergan, supra note 18 (discussing the processes by which humans and their
civilizations analyze their surroundings and events which affect them to reach solutions and
conclusions).
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another.22 The Church of England was granted special benefits by
law in Virginia before the Revolution that it did not maintain after
the Revolution. State constitutions expressed the point variously, but
by 1833 all states had removed the special privileges given to an estab-
lished religion. Why did our ancestors do this? Was it to emulate the
spirit of the French Enlightenment, embodied in the French Revolu-
tion's general doubt about religion? It is true that the founders were
aware of Enlightenment thought whether from France, England or
Scotland. But their decision to disestablish the officially preferred
church-the Anglican church in the southern states, or later the
Congregational church in New England-had nothing to do with
animosity toward religion. On the contrary, through the free exer-
cise provision Americans have guaranteed that the religious question
will be on our agenda at the many turns of our story as a people; and
through the nonestablishment provision we have guaranteed that the
government is disempowered from promoting or advancing a na-
tional orthodoxy about what to believe or a national orthopraxy
about how to behave. 3 Thus, one of the first mistaken moves in in-
terpreting the constitutional texts about religion is that there are two
separate clauses in the First Amendment tending in opposite direc-
tions. In their eighteenth century setting, these provisions were vir-
tually interchangeable.n In the context of the complex pluralism of
today's society, the one protects the other.26 Disempowering the gov-
ernment from privileging one community over another is a way of
ensuring that all sorts of religious differences-between Jews and
' Professor Laycock defines "substantive neutrality" as follows: "the religion clauses require
government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief
or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." Douglas Laycock, Forma4,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001-04 (1990)
(discussing how "separationists" and "religionists" in modem times cannot agree on the mean-
ing of the First Amendment).
See FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS AND
THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 10 (1995) (examining the relationship between religious free-
dom and "free political discourse" in a religiously pluralistic society).
" See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 1, at 1; Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitu-
tion: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
311, 313 (1986) (arguing that "the two clauses are but two sides of the same coin, a coin which
represents a single 'value' in our constitutional democracy-religious freedom"). For a sample
of the sort of thinking that purports to discover a "natural antagonism" between the two clauses,
seeJOHN E. NOWAK & ROLAND D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1218 (5th ed. 1995); Nowak
and Rotunda also find the tendency "to appeal to history when analyzing issues under the relig-
ion clauses" to be "unfortunate because there is no clear history as to the meaning of the
clauses." Id. at 1221.
" See, e.g., THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 206 (1986) (analyzing legislative history of the Religion
Clause).
The Williamsburg Charter, a bicentennial document celebrating religious freedom, de-
scribes nonestablishment and free exercise as "mutually reinforcing provisions [that] act as a




Christians, Catholics and Protestants, Muslims and Hindus, believers
and nonbelievers-can thrive in America as almost nowhere else in
the world. The telos, or end goal, of disestablishment is free exercise.
That does not devalue disestablishment. It tells us why we have it.
Judge John Noonan writes: "Free exercise-let us as Americans
assert it-is an American invention. How foolish it would be to let a
false modesty, a nervous fear of chauvinism obscure the originality.,
2
1
Noonan is able to make this boast because he knows the difference
between toleration and freedom. Toleration is what John Locke
urged at the end of the seventeenth century.2 Free exercise of relig-
ion is whatJames Madison wrote into the First Amendment a century
later. As Noonan wrote, "[n]ever before 1791, was there a tablet of
the law, a legal text guaranteeing to all a freedom from religious op-
pression by the national legislature. Never before 1791, such a pub-
lic, almost unalterable commitment to this ideal."2 Toleration is not
the same as free exercise; Locke, for example, had no more tolera-
tion for the free exercise of Catholicism than did Oliver Cromwell."
More clearly than others in his generation of founders, Madison
grasped the critical difference between toleration and free exercise.
Already in 1774, when Madison was twenty-two years old, he "had
formed and had articulated the insight that in revolutionary America
would carry the day for the free exercise of religion."3' If the life of
the law is not logic but experience, it is well to inquire what led Madi-
son to this moment of understanding that informed not only his own
moral universe, but the very fabric of our country. On his way to Wil-
liamsburg, Madison encountered about a half dozen Separate Baptist
preachers being held in jail in Culpepper County for their refusal to
seek a license to preach from the royal governor. Shortly after this
experience Madison wrote to William Bradford, his fellow student at
Princeton:
Pride ignorance and Knavery among the Priesthood and Vice and Wick-
edness among the Laity. This is bad enough But It is not the worst I have
to tell you. That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages
among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their
Quota of Imps for such business. This vexes me the most of any thing
whatever. There are at this [time] in the adjacent County not less than 5
NOONAN, supra note 1, at 1.
2 John Locke, Letter on Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 5 (Thomas Tegg ed.,
1823) ("The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion, is so agreeable to
the Gospel ofJesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for
men to be so blind, as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it.").
NOONAN, supra note 1, at 1.
Nearly a half century before Locke, Oliver Cromwell said to the Catholics in Ireland: "As
to freedom of conscience, I meddle with no man's conscience; but if you mean by that, liberty
to celebrate the Mass, I would have you understand that in no place where the power of the Par-
liament of England prevails shall that be permitted." (quoted in SIDNEY HooK, THE PARADOXES
OF FREEDOM 23 (1962)).
" NOONAN, supra note 1, at 68-69.
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or 6 well meaning men in close Goal for publishing their religious Sen-
32
timents which in the main are very orthodox.
This episode of the jailed preachers proved to be a critical mo-
ment in legal history. Madison was named on May 6, 1776, to a com-
mittee to prepare "a declaration of rights for revolutionary Virginia."
George Mason, the senior member, a devout Anglican, proposed the
following on religious freedom:
That as Religion, or the Duty which we owe to our divine and omnipotent
Creator, and the Manner of discharging it, can be governed only by Rea-
son and Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore that all Men
shou'd enjoy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according
to the Dictates of Conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the Mag-
istrate, unless, under Colour of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace, the
Happiness, or Safety of Society, or of Individuals. And that is the mutual
Duty of all, to practice Christian Forbearance, Love and Charity towards
Each other.
Thomas Jefferson describes Madison as a person of "extreme mod-
esty." 4 He had no formal training in law. He was only twenty-five years
old in the critical year of the separation from the parent country. Tak-
ing all three of these things into account, we should marvel at Madi-
son's determination to press beyond toleration. He proposed crucial
changes in Mason's text: eliminating the restriction about disturbing
the peace, attacking state support of religion, and removing the term
"toleration" and substituting the term that was to be enshrined in the
First Amendment, "free exercise of religion."
Madison's redraft of Mason's proposal was as follows:
That Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction
only, not of violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the
full and free exercise of it accordg [sic] to the dictates of Conscience; and
therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be
invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any
penalties or disabilities unless under &c.
Madison was forced to redraft again, postponing for another day
the battle over disestablishment, a battle he won both in Virginia and
in the First Congress. There have been many twists and turns in the
story of religious freedom-some of them exhilarating, others de-
plorable-that lead to the present. But this Article is not the place to
explore byways. For now, I can only state my view that Madison pro-
" Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in THE PAPERS OFJAMES
MADISON, 16 MARCH 1751-16 DECEMBER 1779, at 106 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E.
Rachal eds., 1962) [hereinafter MADISON, ARTICLES].
Declaration of Rights and Form of Government of Virginia (May 20-25, 1776), id. at 172-
73.
THOMASJEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, WRITINGS 61 (1907).
MADISON, ARTICLES, supra note 32 at 174 (emphasis added).
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vided the historical baseline for protecting religious freedom in
America. He merely provided a line, not a wall.
Sherbert v. Verner is a classic text. It can be read broadly, as it was
in Wisconsin v. Yoder," or narrowly, as it was in Employment Division v.
Smith. 9 Read with skepticism in Smith, Sherbert was confined to spe-
cific facts such as entitlement to a particular form of welfare benefit,
which in Smith was unemployment compensationi4 Read with re-
spect, Sherbert stands for a broader proposition, that the best way to
secure religious freedom in the context of the modem bureaucratic
welfare state is to shift to the government attorney the evidentiary
burdens of proof in cases where a legitimate claim of free exercise of
religion is raised. Adell Sherbert was a Seventh-day Adventist who
sought unemployment benefits when she was laid off for refusing to
work on her Sabbath. The Court viewed the Hobson's choice given
to Ms. Sherbert-either to follow her conscience and forego the wel-
fare benefit to which she was entitled or to secure the entitlement at
the cost of violating her conscience-as the kind of penalty that the
government may not place upon religious decisions. 1 Justice Bren-
nan created a new standard for reviewing such claims. In order to
prevail over a claim that a government regulation burdened free ex-
ercise of religion, the government would have to demonstrate that
the regulation in question was demanded by a compelling govern-
mental interest and that the government had no less restrictive alter-
native to the regulation.42
', ThomasJefferson coined the wall metaphor in his letter to the Danbury Baptists onJan. 1,
1802. 8 JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 113. The wall metaphor came into the discourse of the
Supreme Court in the first Mormon case, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), and
in the modem period made its appearance in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16
(1947). The Justices have not agreed about the composition of the wall. For Justice Black in
Everson the wall was meant to be "high and impregnable." Id. at 18. Justice Jackson lamented in
his concurrence in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948), that
the wall was "as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson" at the Univer-
sity of Virginia. For ChiefJustice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), "the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depend-
ing on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." James Madison suggested not a wall,
but a line differentiating "the rights of religion and the Civil authority." Letter ofJames Madi-
son to the ReverendJasper Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRTNGS OFJAMES MADISON 487 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1910). Historian Sidney E. Mead notes that Madison's metaphor of a line, unlikeJef-
ferson's wall, "does not conjure up the image of a solid and unchanging structure built by the
founders, but rather 'the path of a moving point, thought of as having length but not breadth.'"
Sidney E. Mead, Neither Church nor State: Reflections on James Madison's "Line of Separation," 10 J.
CHURCH & STATE 349,350 (1968).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (noting that Sherbert requires the state to be more particular in
explaining why their strong interest should be allowed to interfere with religion).
" 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a law not aimed at religion did not violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, even if it interfered with religion).
See GARRETT EPpS, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 114-17 (2001).
4, See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417.
Id. at 403.
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The historical setting of Sherbert was less than a decade after the
Court had begun its bold move to confront the brutality ofJim Crow"
in Brown v. Board of Education.14 The message to Attorneys General
was they must have solid reasons-the Court called them "compelling
state interests"-to justify the racial classifications in statutes or prac-
tices they were defending as consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One way of describing this
form of analysis is that the judiciary was performing its task of scruti-
nizing reasons for policies carefully, or that it was undertaking ra-
tionality review as though it mattered. The Court was becoming
more skeptical. Phony reasons for racism that abounded throughout
the Jim Crow era would not cut it any more. The Court did not call
its work an inquiry about the "rational basis" of a notorious set of laws
that mocked the Reconstruction Congress and its achievement, the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, it called the new task "strict scru-
tiny."
The unfortunate fallout of this label is that for decades "rational
basis" review was something of a joke. When philosophers or other
scientists investigate the rationality of a claim, they are setting about
an important task. When judges in the Warren Court era pretended
to do so, everyone would sigh, knowing that the judicial fix was in and
that the State would certainly win. As I shall explain below, this ap-
proach to rational basis scrutiny changed in the Burger Court's first
gender discrimination case, Reed v. Reed,45 where the Court began to
take the search for rationality seriously.
46
When Justice Brennan borrowed the discourse of strict scrutiny in
equal protection cases to create a new standard for free exercise
cases, he was intentionally sending a message that free exercise would
be protected vigorously. The strict scrutiny standard required the
government to prove that its interest in the classification was not a
merely ordinary interest, but one of the highest order. 7 Brennan
cited Thomas v. Collins,48 a post-World War II case that protected labor
speech against the attempt of some states to stifle that form of com-
munication.49 In Thomas v. Collins, Justice Rutledge wrote:
" For a classic study of segregation in America, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OFJIM CROW (3d ed. 1974).
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding dejure racial segregation in schools unconstitutional).
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See id. at 76 (holding that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either
sex... merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause").
,' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
4' 323 U.S. 516 (1945). See also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (stating that similarly to Thomas, "in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limitation'").
" See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 540 (holding that the Texas statute, which placed registration re-
quirements on labor organizers, could not constitutionally be used to prevent a labor organ-
izer's exercise of free speech).
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[A]ny attempt to restrict those liberties [free speech or free assembly]
must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection be-
tween the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other
contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds,
will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly,
whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger,
actual or impending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our
tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for
its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in conjunction
with peaceable assembly
To have adopted this way of speaking about the judicial task in
1963 signaled that the Court was committed to the protection of free
exercise with a vigor similar to that it had been displaying in racial
discrimination cases. In this mode of analysis, the judges were, in ef-
fect, going to take theirjob as an independent branch of government
seriously. The reason offered in justification of a racial classification
had to be truly "compelling." Such reasons for public policy, moreo-
ver, could not be invented or made up by the government attorney
on his way to the courthouse or by ajudicial clerk with an expertise in
creative writing.
Although it was very difficult for a government attorney to dem-
onstrate a sound argument for the compelling need for a racial classi-
fication-something that did not happen until Bakke'-it was more
likely that a government attorney could prevail in a free exercise case
by showing the supreme importance or the compelling character of
the governmental interest threatened by allowing a claim of free ex-
ercise in a particular instance.
Legitimate claims of governmental interests can be made without
exaggeration. Prison security is one of them, but that interest should
not be overextended to serve as the basis for keeping Muslims from
praying on Fridays when arrangements are made in the same prison
for Jews to pray on Saturdays and for Catholics and Protestants to
pray on Sundays, 2 or for serving pork to Muslim orJewish prisoners."
There is no rationality for these practices and no judge who is sensi-
I&/ at 530. Justice Brennan expressly relied upon Thomas in Sherbert 374 U.S. at 406.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (reversing decision of appeals
court insofar as it "fail[s] to recognize that the state has a substantial interest that legitimately
may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive considera-
tion of race and ethnic origins").
5' SeeO'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 367 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("If the
Court's standard of review is to represent anything more than reflexive deference to prison of-
ficials, any finding of reasonableness must rest on firmer ground than the record now pres-
ents.").
See Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding genuine issue of fact as to
whether prison's interests outweighed inmate's free exercise rights).
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five to the free exercise of religion secured in the Constitution she
swore to support should countenance them.
Another component of the Sherbert analysis, the "least restrictive
alternative" standard, was meant to curb the tendency of government
attorneys to exaggerate the interest they are protecting. Justice
Brennan borrowed this category not from equal protection analysis,
but from cases involving claims of discrimination against out-of-state
merchants adjudicated under the Commerce Clause. There is, how-
ever, a deep resonance between these two provisions. Just as John
Bingham and his colleagues of the 39th Congress intended the Four-
teenth Amendment to extend the protection of the Bill of Rights to
cover infringements by the States, 4 so too Madison and his colleagues
at the Constitutional Convention intended the Commerce Clause to
serve as a grant of power to the national Congress to stop economic
discrimination against out-of-state merchants by the several States.-5
Once the Court characterized a commercial regulation as protective
of local business interests, there was little chance that it would pass
constitutional muster. That result would not change even if the gov-
ernment attorney attempted to characterize the interest at the high-
est imaginable level of generalization.
One example will illustrate the operation of the principle that
Brennan sought to apply to free exercise cases. In Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison,5 6 the city asserted that its regulation requiring inspec-
tion of milk within the city as one of protecting the highest order of
concern, public health. 7 That interest could be taken for granted as
the real reason, not a fictive one, behind the regulation.58 Even so,
the regulation would fail because the city had adequate alternative
means of achieving its laudable goal of protecting the public against
impure milk that would not have the effect of imposing a differential
cost on out-of-state dairy producers that were not imposed upon local
Wisconsin dairy farmers.' 9 For example, the city could send its in-
spectors to dairy farms in Illinois to do regular or spot checks of qual-
ity controls for pasteurization of milk, thus eliminating the necessity
of the Illinois farmers to transport their milk to Madison twice, once
for inspection in a raw form, then to markets in Wisconsin for sale.60
Statement of John Bingham, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1090 (1866) ("Is it not
essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens [of the United States]?").
" GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 467 (1969)
(noting that "[ilt was the 'vile state governments' [and] corruption and mutability of the Legis-
lative Councils of the States, the 'evils operating in the states,' that actually led to the overhaul-
ing of the federal government in 1787").
340 U.S. 349 (1951).






Applied to free exercise cases, this principle could have served
well as the basis for protecting religious freedom while acknowledg-
ing the legitimacy of important, even compelling interests of the gov-
ernment that should not easily be overcome merely by the assertion
of a conflict between the regulation and the burden it places upon
religious belief and practice. I return to this point at the end of this
Article.
After Sherbert, the Court applied the compelling interest test to in-
validate other similar instances of denial of welfare benefits to per-
sons whose reasons for not working were religiously grounded. One
could think of these cases as repetitious, but that would be to focus
only on the form of the governmental benefit at issue. Another way
of reading them is that by rejecting the reasoning that lower courts
and government officials were employing in these cases to distinguish
Sherbert, the Court was repeating affirmation of its precedential value.
Certainly that is the way-for richer and for poorer-in which the
lower courts were behaving. They thought they had to search for a
compelling governmental interest and a least restrictive alternative in
cases involving a claimed violation of free exercise of religion.
A richer way of reading these cases is to observe that the Court was
expanding our communal awareness of the ways in which religious
difference should be honored. Thus in Thomas v. Review Board,61 it
was reinforcing its teaching in the conscientious objector cases62 that
recognize the many ways in which people could serve their country,
both by bearing arms in the military and by refusing to do so on
grounds of consciencei6 In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion,' the Court held that a religious believer may not be penalized
for changing her mind or for becoming a member of a different re-
ligious community. To impose a rule of consistency of religious rea-
soning upon free exercise claimants was to misunderstand both that
it was the governmental imposition of a religious rule that violates the
nonestablishment principle and that it was a classic instance of what
Emerson condemned when he wrote that "a foolish consistency is the
" 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (holding impermissible the State's denial of unemployment
compensation to aJehovah's Witness who quit his employment because he was transferred to a
position that produced weapons, which conflicted with his religious beliefs opposing war).
' See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (granting conscientious objector
status to an individual who held a deep moral opposition to war, although this conviction was
not based on religion); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187-88 (1965) (holding that con-
scientious objector status can apply to individuals who are not members of orthodox sects); Gi-
rouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946) (holding that naturalization privileges can be
granted to people whose religion prevents them from bearing arms).
"John F. Kennedy wrote to a friend after the United Nations Symposium held in San Fran-
cisco injune 1945 that "war will exist until that distant day when the conscientious objector en-
joys the same reputation and prestige that the warrior does today." ARTHUR SCHLESINGERJR., A
THousAND DAYs 88 (1965).
480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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hobgoblin of little minds." In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employ-
ment Security,66 without denigrating the communal character of faith,
the Court upheld the claim of individual conscience without reading
Sherbert to require membership in a particular religious community.
67
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,6 the Court applied the reasoning of Sherbert
to reach the conclusion that the government may not require com-
pulsory school attendance after elementary education. Yoder illus-
trates that the Court was not stuck in a mold that confined free exer-
cise matters to unemployment claims. To read Yoder as though it
were not a vindication of free exercise is revisionist thinking that has
no basis in the record of that case or in Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion for the Court. In short, it is unreasonable.
B. The Emergence of Toothless Strict Scrutiny: From Lee to Lyng
I suggested above that by its repeated affirmation of Sherbert, the
Court was trying to send a message to government officials about the
importance of religious freedom in our constitutional order. In this
section of the Article I clarify that throughout the 1980s this message
was, to understate the point, mixed. As with the story ofJacob steal-
ing the blessing that Isaac had intended to give to Esau, the Court
cloaked its opinions in the external dress of Sherbert, but the ungen-
erous results clearly marked that its voice on religious freedom was
no longer that of a James Madison. This shift is what I describe as
toothless strict scrutiny.
One way of viewing these cases is that they contain a message
about the danger of success in achieving a judicial standard. On the
surface it may sound fine to require that both of the criteria in Sher-
bert be honored in free exercise cases, but if the results keep going
steadily in the direction of rejecting free exercise claims, then some-
thing must yield. In 1990 we learned in Employment Division v. Smith7o
that the criteria in Sherbert had to go. Before looking at Smith, how-
ever, it would help to do a cursory review of the cases of the 1980s in
which protection of free exercise was undermined.
There were two recurrent difficulties with the compelling interest
standard. It tempted government attorneys to inflate the nature of
' Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, reprinted in ESSAYS 45, 58 (Houghton Mifflin 1883)
(1841).
489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that the denial of unemployment benefits to an individual
because his refusal to work was not based on the requirements of an established religious sect
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
67 Id. at 833 ("Never did we suggest that unless a claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what
his job requires, his belief, however sincere, must be deemed a purely personal preference
rather than a religious belief.").
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Genesis 27:1-45.
0 See494 U.S. 872 (1990). See supra note 39.
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the governmental interest by telling courts that their little "slice" of
the regulatory "pie" is quintessential to good government, and too
many judges believed these exaggerations, more or less in the man-
ner in which challenges to racial classifications were too often unsuc-
cessful until 1954.7' For example, ChiefJustice Burger really did not
have to believe that the Social Security system would collapse by al-
lowing the exemption sought in United States v. Le 2 by Amish farm-
ers. The reason why the governmental interest should not have been
taken to that level of generality is that the Amish never make any
claims upon the system because of their religious commitment to
take care of the elderly without government support.7 3 It is one thing
to send a party seeking tax relief off to Congress to get a new statute
addressing their concerns; it is another to pretend that the Court was
making a reasonable attempt to apply Sherbert rigorously to the facts
of Lee.
In Bowen v. Ro 4 Solicitor General Fried urged the Court to aban-
don Sherbert. He persuaded three members of the Court-ChiefJus-
tice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist-to do so. Chief Jus-
tice Burger had written for eight Justices in Yoder "only those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance le-
gitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."71 In Bowen v. Roy he
wrote: "Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular
religious beliefs or against religion in general, the Government meets
its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for
governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest."76 A ma-
jority of the Court-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
and O'Connor-expressly rejected this view of the appropriate stan-
dard. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
wrote in a concurring and dissenting opinion that the standard pro-
posed by the Chief Justice "has no basis in precedent and relegates a
' See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a state statute requiring
separate accommodations for black and white passengers on railroads did not violate the Thir-
teenth or Fourteenth Amendments and is a reasonable exercise of State police power); Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the teaching of
white and black pupils in the same institution does not violate the Constitution and is a valid
exercise of State power).
" 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding a state requirement that the Amish make contributions
to the Social Security system).
'3 See id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The Court rejects the particular claim of this ap-
pellee, not because it presents any special problems, but rather because of the risk that a myriad
of other claims would be too difficult to process. The Court overstates the magnitude of this
risk because the Amish claim applies only to a small religious community with an established
welfare system of its own.").
" 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that a federal and state agency requirement that a Social
Security number be used to process welfare benefits does not violate First Amendment free ex-
ercise rights or impair religious freedom).
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added).
.6 476 U.S. at 707-08.
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serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny
that the Equal Protection Clause already provides."
77
Shortly thereafter, the march began to define categories of cases
to which Sherbert would not apply. The first category was the military.
In Goldman v. Weinberge]5 the Court ruled that an orthodox rabbi had
no free exercise right to wear a yarmulke beneath the cap he wore as
part of his military uniform. Goldman represented another instance
of puffing by the government, which urged that the case presented
an issue of national security. 9 The esprit de corps of the Israeli De-
fense Forces counters this logic, since many soldiers in this army wear
yarmulkes, but no one has ever thought of them as something de-
structive of national security.
In dissent Justice Brennan, the author of Sherbert, suggested that
the Court's "credulous deference to unsupported assertions of mili-
tary necessity" was subject to Congressional action that would "correct
this wrong."0  Congress has the power "to lay and collect
Taxes... [and] to pay the Debts and provide for the Common De-
fence and general Welfare,"' and the power "[t] o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. "'12 Relying
on these powers, Congress had ordered the Secretary of Defense to
provide that members of the armed forces may wear items of relig-
ious apparel whole in uniform, except where the Secretary of Defense
determines that donning such apparel would interfere with the per-
formance of military duties, or where the apparel is not neat or con-
servative.83 As vigorous protection of free exercise began to decline in
the Court, Congress began to take notice and provide statutory relief
consistent with its oath of office to support the Constitution. No one
objected that the Congressional action was an assault upon the power
of the Court to say what the law is in an appropriate case or contro-84
versy.
Id. at 727.
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
Judge Abner Mikva commented on Goldman: "A strong and independent military is essen-
tial to the national security, and courts should not lightly overturn military judgments as to the
best means of ensuring that security." Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'd en banc
sub nom- Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). NoteJustice Frankfurter's suggestion in
Gobitis that the refusal of the Witnesses to salute the flag represented a threat to national secu-
rity: "National unity is the basis of national security." Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 595 (1940). Justice Jackson addressed this point in Barnette "National unity as an end
which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is
whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its
achievement." W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
Goldman, 475 U.S. at 514,524.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. cl. 14.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, §
508.101 Stat. 1019, 1086-87 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1987)).




The next category of cases that the Court virtually, defined out of
the Sherbert equation was claims of unlawful religious discrimination
brought by state prisoners. Shortly after Sherbert, the Court indicated
that it would take these claims seriously.s8 In OLone v. Estate of
Shabazz,s6 Muslim prisoners were, in effect, told that their duty of ob-
serving Friday prayer 7 was not worthy of free exercise protection.
Justices White and O'Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in
adopting a reasonableness standard for free exercise claims pre-
sented by prisoners. Justice Brennan, the author of Sherbert, argued
that the prison officials had not met the least restrictive alternative
standard with respect to the four alternatives proposed by the Muslim
prisoners. The Rehnquist opinion for a majority of the Court ig-
nored this issue.
In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia cited the Court's si-
lence in OLone as evidence that the Court had abandoned strict scru-
tiny in free exercise cases generally.s' The impact of this judicial atti-
tude on lower courts was significant. Before OLone they had been
willing to require prison wardens to accommodate the dietary re-
quirements of Orthodox Jews by providing kosher meals.9 After
O'Lone that was no longer necessary." Assume for a moment that
Sherbert should not apply in the context of prisons. What is the ra-
tionality of doing something as insensitive as slopping pork on the
plates of Muslim prisoners? Could not a plausible argument be made
that behavior of this sort does not foster prison discipline, but un-
dermines it by gratuitous insult to a prisoner's faith system? If the
government is allowed to undermine the faith of prisoners, will that
have an impact on the rehabilitation of prisoners?
The third category of cases that the Court removed from the pro-
tection of Sherbert involved American Indian claims involving the use of
government land. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Asso-
ciation,9' Justice O'Connor severely undercut Sherbert, but not by trivi-
See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (holding that while prison officials have wide
administrative latitude, they must still respect Constitutional rights of prisoners); Cooper v.
Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (holding that state prisoner had a cause of action where he was de-
nied permission to purchase certain religious publications solely because of his religious belief).
" 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding a prison may enforce its regulations, despite interfering
with religious practices, so long as the regulations are "reasonably related to a legitimate penal"
objective).
" See Qur'an 62:9-10 (proclaiming Friday as the Day of Assembly, the weekly meeting of the
congregation to unite and worship).
'3 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
' See, e.g., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that prison authorities
must provide a diet sufficient to sustain the prisoner in good health without violating the Jewish
dietary laws). But see United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying Jewish
prisoners' application for an order requiring Bureau of Prisons to provide Kosher meals).
' See Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating, in dicta, that on remand the
recent Smith decision would allow for surnmaryjudgment if the Court determined that pork was
being served as a general, secular regulation).
9' 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (reversing appellate court's decision and remanding case on grounds
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alizing the threat to Native American beliefs posed by the proposed
construction of a timber logging road through a remote area in
northern California that was sacred land in Indian belief. On the
contrary, she explicitly acknowledged that the proposed project
would have "devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac-
tices," and she assumed that "the threat to the efficacy of at least
some religious practices [of the Indians] is extremely grave." It was
the next move in the argument that should give one pause. "What-
ever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however,
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is,
after all, its land."93 O'Connor suggested that the Indians turn to
Congress for whatever remedy the political branches might provide. 4
As noted above, Congress has the power to tax and spend, as well as
to dispose of federal property. Justice Brennan dissented on the view
that it is pointless, or irrational, to require "native Americans who re-
quest that the Government refrain from destroying their relig-
ion... [to] seek to exact from the Government de facto beneficial
ownership of federal property."95 But the Indians turned to Congress,
and as in Goldman, Congress provided a more generous remedy to
the Indians than the Court deemed necessary.96 Once again, no one
thought that the structure of judicial review was assaulted or that
Marbuy was about to crumble.
C. The Abandonment of Strict Scrutiny: From Smith to Boerne
Against the backdrop of such cases as Lee, Roy, Goldman, Shabazz,
and Lyn, is it any wonder that there came a Pharaoh who knew not
Joseph?9 In April of 1990, the Court announced the virtual death
knell of Sherbert in Employment Division v. Smith.98 That case has, of
course, already been commented upon extensively.99 So I will be brief
that the First Amendment does not prevent petitioners from finishing a road or permitting




Id. at 458 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Within months after Lyng, Congress withheld authorization from the Secretary of the In-
terior to build the proposed road. Amendments to Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1826 (Sept. 27, 1988). See H.R.
Rep. No. 713, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988) (prohibiting "the use of funds for construction of
the Gasquet-Orleans (G-O) road in California, pending further review of the issue of Indian
religious rights that would be significantly affected by the road construction").
See Exodus 1:8.
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that employers firing petitioners who used peyote did not
violate Free Exercise Clause since the law was not aimed at promoting or restricting religious
beliefs).
"See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 1109 (1990). But
see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308
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in this section of the Article, focusing only upon the way in which the
Smith Court transformed free exercise from the linchpin of our liber-
ties into a constitutional redundancy. The Court did so by suggesting
that free exercise has little or no independent value, but might add
an indefinable flavor if tossed into a pot of stone soup. The anoma-
lous reduction of free exercise to "a constitutional right that has
meaning only when it is combined with another right" is compared
by Jim Gordon to Hamburger Helper."°
Much of what people do when they are exercising their religious
convictions involves some form of communication or expressive activ-
ity-listening, speaking, singing, waiting quietly, marching in proces-
sion. Thus it is possible to characterize a free exercise claim under
the rubric of free speech. 0' For example, on Flag Day in 1943, the
Court announced in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette'02
that school officials could not require Jehovah's Witnesses to salute
the flag. The ground for this decision was that the government may
not compel people to say things they do not believe. Three years ea r-
lier in Minersville SchoolDistrict v. Gobiti"P5 the Witnesses had been told
that they had no free exercise right to an exemption from saluting
the flag. If someone were to say years later that these two results can
be harmonized on the ground that the 1940 decision was a free exer-
cise case and the 1943 decision was a free speech case, would that be
reasonable? A reason was assigned for the difference. But is it a
plausible distinction? Does the reason offered make any sense?
One way to decide would be to ask the Witnesses about the basis
for their refusal to salute the flag. In both instances, they would tell
us, it was manifestly a religious matter based squarely upon their in-
terpretation of the Second Commandment prohibiting worship of
(1991).
"0 James D. Gordon III, FreeExercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 & 98 n.49 (1991).
... Characterizing free exercise as free speech is no guarantee that the religious speech will
be protected. Sometimes it has been. See, eg., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (protecting studentjournal's right to choose which articles to publish
based on religious editorial viewpoints-not religion itself-by reversing order of summary
judgment in favor of respondents); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (protecting petitioner's right to use school property for showing a film series
on Christian family values because denying access was viewpoint based discrimination); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (protecting students' rights to use university buildings and
grounds for religious worship); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (protecting appellees'
right to cover a portion of their license plates reading "Live Free or Die" based on First
Amendment rights). Sometimes it has not. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding that a regulation limiting religious and all other solicitation
to areas outside an airport is reasonable because an airport is not a traditional public forum and
the regulation is a reasonable requirement to promote efficient air travel); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (holding that a State law restricting relig-
ious and all other distribution, selling, and fund solicitation activities to a fixed location was not
unconstitutional because the rule applied equally to all organizations).
'" 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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graven images' °4 and upon their interpretation of the events unfold-
ing in Nazi Germany, in which the nation-state was deified and abso-
lute allegiance to the Ffthrer was demanded, with special prominence
given to the swastika flag at mass rallies planned as pagan liturgical
rituals. 5 Or one could carefully read the opinion in the second flag
salute case. Justice Jackson wrote in Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other funda-
mental rights .ay' not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.
The Barnette court expressly overruled Gobitis, a point duly noted
by Justice Frankfurter, the author of Gobitis, who dissented in Barnette.
If years later someone were to claim that these two cases are reconcil-
able, the claim should not be regarded as reasonable. Neither should
it be when the Court relied on Gobitis without mentioning that Bar-
nette overruled it, a move as reasonable as citing P/essy v. Ferguson after
Brown v. Board of Education. This is the stuff of which Rule Eleven
0 7
sanctions are made, but only if lawyers, notJustices, make the gaffe.
As noted above in the discussion of Goldman and Lyng, the politi-
cal branches need not be supine when the Court issues a ruling. Jus-
tice Scalia wrote in Smith:
Values that are protected against government interference through en-
shrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the politi-
cal process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection ac-
corded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a soci-
ety that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It is
therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception
to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.' °s
Neither Congress nor the Executive may interfere with the judicial
function of deciding the law of a case. But the political branches are
also empowered to protect our liberties by the same Constitution that
judges and all public officials are bound by oath to support. Con-
gress held hearings and by a unanimous vote in the House and a
See Exodus 20:3-4; Deuteronomy 5:7-9.
See THE HOLOCAUST CHRONICLE 171 (David J. Hogan et al. eds., 2000) ("From 1933 to
1945, the Nazis imprisoned 10,000 Jehovah's Witnesses, executing more than 200 for refusing
military service. As many as 5,000 died in concentration camps. Despite persecution, Witnesses
clung fervently to their religious beliefs, which did not allow the bearing of arms, and steadfastly
refused to swear allegiance to the Nazi state."); see also 2 FALK PINGEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
HOLOCAUST 742 (Israel Gutman ed., 1990).
"6 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (2) (imposing sanctions on attorneys who file frivolous claims).
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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nearly unanimous (97-3) vote in the Senate enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),109 which President Clinton signed
on November 16, 1993.
As much has been written about this statute, I will be brief1 10 It is
a mistake to think of this legislation as "reversing Smith." Each coor-
dinate branch of government is entitled to respect within its proper
sphere. Thus the law of the case in Smith is most emphatically what
the Court said it was, and RFRA did not purport to challenge that.
Nor should it in our system of separation of powers. The most im-
portant thing that Congress did in this legislation was to provide for a
remedy: "A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a gov-
ernment." 1 The remedy was statutory, but there is no doubt that the
remedy itself involved a substantive view of religious freedom that
nearly everybody in Congress deemed worthy of surrounding with
more protection than the Court thought necessary in Smith:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability... [but it
may do so] only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.11
Before turning to the Court's response to RFRA, I would like to
note the response of the Oregon legislature to Smith. In the briefs in
Smith, Attorney General Frohnmayer did not urge the Court to aban-
don Sherbert. No one in Smith briefed or urged this shift in criteria.
Instead, Frohnmayer urged that Oregon satisfied the requirement of
showing a compelling state interest in the prohibition of peyote by
arguing the slippery slope."' If Oregon yielded on the ceremonial
use of peyote, what could it say about the wholesale distribution of
crack? To mix two metaphors, is the war on drugs a seamless gar-
ment? Or was this argument another example of an overgeneraliza-
tion of a governmental interest? Whatever it was, the argument con-
vinced Justice O'Connor to concur in the judgment on that
" Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994)).
"' See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act; 39 ViL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (analyzing RFRA and identifying considerations
in its interpretations, applications, effects, and problems); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Tho-
mas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994) (interpreting the
RFRA and Congress' purpose based on legislative history).
... 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (1994).
£22 Id. § 2000bb-1 (a)-2000bb-1 (b).
", See GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 120-21 (2001)
(describing Frohnmayer's "unusually determined" handling of the "small case" out of a concern
that a loss for the government would "open the door to a flood of religious claims by devotees
of drugs he saw as far more harmful than peyote").
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ground." 4 O'Connor wrote: "There is also no dispute that Oregon
has a significant interest in enforcing laws that control the possession
and use of controlled substances by its citizens."15 Interestingly
enough, once Smith was announced and the Attorney General no
longer had the burden of proving to the Court that Oregon's interest
in keeping Native Americans from worshipping by ingesting peyote
was a compelling one, and one as to which there was no less restric-
tive alternative than its total prohibition, Frohnmayer felt free to urge
the State legislature to provide an exemption, as the federal govern-
ment"6 and nearly half of the state legislatures 7 had done, for cere-
monial use of peyote. The Oregon legislature did so." 8
Before deciding the constitutionality of RFRA, the Court had an-
other opportunity to breathe some life back into Sherbert. In Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,"9 the Court ruled that
where there is evidence of intentional targeting of a religious com-
munity, then a tougher standard for protecting free exercise is ap-
propriate. The Court unanimously invalidated the ordinances, but
did so on the curious rationale that the Santeria faith had been sub-
jected to persecution. Did the court mean to articulate a new "perse-
cution" standard for finding unconstitutional infringements on relig-
ious freedom? What are the potential uses of this principle? What
will count as "persecution"? Justice Kennedy's opinion seems disso-
nant with the voice of Madison warning in his famous Memorial and
Remonstrance.
[I] t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We
hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of the
noblest characteristics of the late revolution. The free men of America
did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and
.. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-07 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (criticizing the majority's reliance on First Amendment precedent
and arguing that the same result could be accomplished using free exercise jurisprudence).
.15 Id. at 904. Justice O'Connor cited Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 674
(1989), for the proposition that drug abuse is "one of the greatest problems affecting the health
and welfare of our population" and thus "one of the most serious problems confronting our
society today." Was that the precise interest that Oregon was defending in Smith? Put slightly
differently, did the sacramental use of peyote by the Indians threaten that governmental inter-
est?
"6 In his Smith dissent, Justice Blackmun cited 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1989), which provides:
"The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use
of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of
the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from registration." See Smith, 494 U.S.
at 912 n.5 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
... Id. ("[Twenty-three] States, including many that have significant Native American popula-
tions, have statutory or judicially crafted exemptions in their drug laws for religious use of pe-
yote.").
.. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5) (Supp. 1998) (making religious use of peyote an affirma-
tive defense to prosecution for unlawful delivery, possession, or manufacture of a controlled
substance).
"9 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
' Id at 546 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
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entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in
the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the princi-
ple.
Justice Kennedy also wrote for the Court in City ofBoerne v. Flores.
In that case, the Court invalidated the application of RFRA to the
states. Kennedy again invoked the "vital principles" of nonpersecu-
tion that had been violated by the City of Hialeah.123 That invocation
raised anew the question of what that standard, if it is one, might
mean. Kennedy acknowledged these critical facts in Boernc. "The
church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its grow-
ing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at
some Sunday masses." 24
Archbishop Flores then approved a project to construct a larger
sanctuary. The city responded by passing an ordinance that had the
effect of denying permission to build a larger structure to accommo-
date those who had to be turned away because of the small size of the
church. Kennedy's definition of '"persecution" includes "sup-
press[ing] religious belief or practice " 2 Since the Boerne ordinance
had the admitted effect of "suppressing religious belief or practice"
for those denied the opportunity to participate in the Mass, why was
this not another example of "persecution"? Or is the nonpersecution
principle like pornography, capable of being known when seen but
escaping clear definition,26 and thus incapable of serving as a princi-
pled way of measuring when free exercise is violated?
Why did Justice Kennedy scour the extensive hearings on RFRA in
search of "the history of persecution in this country"?2 7 Does it mat-
ter that "the hearings mention[ed] no episodes [of persecution] oc-
curring in the past forty years"?128  Did Justice Kennedy invoke the
forty year period to avoid the egregious examples of persecution
' James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man (1784), in A
WALLOF SEPARATION? 132, 133 (Mary C. Segers & Ted G.Jelen eds., 1998).
' 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Professor McConnell wrote of Boerne "[W]hen Congress has
addressed and resolved a constitutional question, the Court should not overturn that interpre-
tation without a powerfuljustification." Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique ofCity of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 187 (1997). On the other hand, Pro-
fessor Currie emphatically stated that, on grounds of separation of powers and federalism, "Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, not to revise
them.... Congress cannot tell the Court what the Constitution means." David P. Currie,
RFRA, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 637, 640 (1998).
' 521 U.S. at 536 ("RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal balance"). See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 523 (referring to the "fundamental
nonpersecution principle of the First Amendment").
.. Boerne; 521 U.S. at 512.
'- Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 523.
'2 SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (StewartJ., concurring) ("I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
"' Boerne; 521 U.S. at 530.
12 Id-
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aimed at the Jehovah's Witnesses a little more than forty years ago?l'
At the time of the flag salute controversy, these atrocities included
beatings, tarring and feathering, castration, and shootings; during
World War II persecution of the Witnesses included mass imprison-
ment for conscientious objection to military service. As Judge
Noonan observed:
[I]f one uses Madisonian criteria, Free Exercise has recently been vio-
lated when school children in Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio were
denied by local authorities the right to attend Christian schools, not to
mention the burden placed upon the Amish in the 1970s that was allevi-
ated only by Wisconsin v. Yoder. The Court would be suffering from am-
nesia not recollecting these crushing weights laid on conscience in the
contemporary United States .... 
130
Justice Kennedy noted that Professor Laycock, who argued the
Boerne case on behalf of Archbishop Flores, acknowledged in his tes-
timony on RFRA before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary that "deliber-
ate persecution is not the usual problem in this country."13' Kennedy
correctly discerned that "the emphasis of the hearings was on laws of
general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion."3 2
Because Employment Division v. Smith-the decision that the hearings
were addressing-was not an instance of "persecution," the emphasis
noted by Justice Kennedy should cause no great surprise. The goal of
the hearings was to create a remedy for persons whose free exercise
of religion had been burdened, not by intentional discrimination of
the sort at issue in the Hialeah case, but by laws of "general applicabil-
ity.' 33 The impact of government regulation on sacred duties more
typically arises from such generally applicable statutes than from stat-
utes in which legislators include in the statement of purpose an in-
tent to inflict injury upon a religious community. Such generally ap-
plicable statutes are typically enacted without any attention to their
differential impact upon believers, or much reflection by legislators
about the possible negative consequences of these statutes for vital
concerns of diverse religious communities.
I began this section where free exercise began as an idea, with
James Madison. I conclude it by noting thatJustice O'Connor wrote
in her Boerne dissent, "Madison did not say that duties to the Creator
"" See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (denying Jehovah's Witnesses'
claim that a flag salute requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause), overruled by W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (declaring unconstitutional state laws mandating
that students pledge allegiance to the flag as a violation of the rights of free speech and free
exercise).
' John T. Noonan,Jr., Religious Liberty at the Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459, 472 (1998) (footnote
omitted).
.. 102nd Cong., 2d Sess., 331-34 (1993); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 2 (1993) ("[L]aws
directly targeting religious practices have become increasingly rare.").
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (1997).
' Id. at 523 (referring to "the principle of general applicability").
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are precedent only to those laws specifically directed at religion, nor
did he strive simply to prevent deliberate acts of persecution or dis-
crimination." m This seems to me an important historical clue that
nonpersecution is not really a good standard for determining a viola-
tion of the positive good that Madison insisted upon, both in Virginia
and in the First Congress: "free exercise of religion."
The latest turn in the dialogue among the branches is that-in re-
sponse to Boerne--Congress enacted and President Clinton signed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.35
Various municipalities have already filed suits in federal courts chal-
lenging the authority of Congress to enact this legislation.
II. GENDER EQUALITY: FROM APATHY TO COMPASSION
A. Antecedents and the Nadir: Exclusion of Women from the
Obligations of Citizenship
The centrality of religious freedom to the American political ex-
perience is a familiar theme. Yet, as I have shown above, this first of
our civil liberties is extremely vulnerable. What then of the protec-
tion of gender equality, which was not a fundamental commitment at
the dawn of the republic? I would like to dwell on the very fact that
the struggle for full participation of women in American civic life has
been protracted and painful. I focus on three principal ways in which
women have been excluded. The first, exclusion of women from the
franchise, prevailed from the dawn of the republic until the late nine-
teenth century in some states, and in others, until 1920, when the
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. The second, exclusion of
women admission to the bar, lasted until the late nineteenth century
in some states and for all practical purposes until after World War II.
The third, exclusion of women from serving on juries, lasted until the
late twentieth century. All three of these themes have been explored
extensively elsewhere. I wish simply to use familiar historical materi-
als to illustrate how these three exclusions resulted in irrational classi-
fications based upon gender.
No one in today's society has a quarrel with the fact that women
vote. No matter what may have been wrong with our republic at the
outset, the original text of the Constitution expressly provides for
amendment. Under this process, outlined in Article V, the Nine-
teenth Amendment came to provide: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex."13 6  To rest upon the
'" Id. at 561 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (limiting a government's power to enforce land
use regulations affecting free exercise of religion).
'- U.S. CONST. amend X1X, § 1.
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achievement nearly a century-and-a-half after the founding is formally
correct. Yet, it is historically unsatisfying because it does not account
for the period in between 1787 and 1920, a period that lacked a ra-
tional basis for a policy that caused untold injury to personal dignity.
For this reason, I offer an account of the struggle over women's par-
ticipation in public life as an example of the recurrent difficulty of
irrationality in American constitutional history.
Viewed in religious discourse, the exclusion of women from the
franchise was one of the original sins of the founding period.137 By
original sin, I do not mean a sexually transmitted disease, although
there is a misunderstanding on this point among believers and non-
believers. I mean an etiological explanation of a recurring situation
of alienation from life in community, described in biblical terms as
sin or rebellion against covenantal obligations such as love, justice,
truth, and peace.' Thus the story of Adam and Eve disobeying the
one command that could have kept them happy in Eden is a way of
getting to the root of our experience of incompleteness without the
gift of what believers call "amazing grace." The parallel in the argu-
ment I set out below is that America was incomplete without the full
participation of its women in civic life, a flaw boldly challenged by the
feminists of the nineteenth century.139 Since biblical law is always set
within narrative, I will also use that device to describe America's al-
ienation from women in a narrative that unfolds our nomos.14
In 1773, the year of the Boston Tea Party and three years before
the colonies became the United States, a pseudonymous columnist
writing under the pen name of Sally Tickle urged women to consider
themselves "as intitled [sic] to a Suffrage, and possessed of Influence,
in the administration of the great Family of the Publick-Take a Part
in the momentous Affairs of the Community, which Providence by
'" The other egregious original sin was the tragic compromise over slavery. For an account
of the origins of the racial theory that undergirded the slavery system, see EDMUND S. MORGAN,
AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975). For a
powerful fictional account of the tragedy, cast in the setting of the Constitutional Convention of
1787, see DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUSTICE
(1987). See also DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (1992). For an account of the effort to set the country on a radical new path of recon-
struction after the Civil War, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998). For an account of the legal order throughout the country that main-
tained a pattern of discrimination based on race long after the Reconstruction Amendments,
see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW (1974).
" See, e.g., Karl Rahner, Original Sin, in SACRAMENTUM MUNDI: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THEOLOcY329-31 (Karl Rahner & Herbert Vorgrimler eds., 1968).
" See, e.g., Lind, supra note 2, at 103.
', See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) ("No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning."); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991) (discussing key "constitutional moments" in American history); Mark
Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Tenn-Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening




the liberal Endowments he has granted you in Mind and person,
manifestly intended for you." 14' It is not anachronistic to reread the
founding documents from the perspective of those who were ex-
cluded from the very discourse for which they are so justly famous.
As Professor Linda Kerber writes:
The revolutionary generation of men who so radically transgressed inher-
ited understandings of the relationship between kings and men, fathers
and sons, nevertheless refused to revise inherited understandings of the
relationship between men and women, husbands and wives, mothers and
children. They continued to assert patriarchal privilege as heads of
households and as civic actors. They explicitly denied married women
142entry into the new political regime.
The Declaration of Independence states that "all men are created" 143
equal. Those words did not decide the question against full par-
ticipation by women in American public life. In the language of the
day, the term "men" included "women," so an argument in favor of
female franchise and service in public office in that setting could not
have succeeded as a linguistic verbal game. Instead, a famous woman
offered a principled, reasoned argument based on communal mem-
ory of the contribution that women had made to the formation of the
new nation conceived in liberty. During the Constitutional Conven-
tion, one of the delegates, John Adams, received, a letter from his
wife, Abigail. It began with the famous words, "Remember the ladies"
and gently warned her husband to expect rebellion from women un-
less the republic paid heed to their concerns.'44 Six years later she
wrote again to him:
Even in the freeest countrys our property is subject to the controul and
disposal of our partners, to whom the Laws have given a sovereign
Authority. Deprived of a voice in Legislation, obliged to submit to those
Laws which are imposed uton us, is it not sufficient to make us indiffer-
ent to the publick Welfare?
In the Declaration of Independence, the Framers provided a long
section of the facts that the Americans presented King George and
Parliament as reasons that impelled Americans to separate from the
parent country.146 The Declaration of Independence also lists a series
of tyrannical acts by the Crown in the style of articles of impeach-
ment King George fundamentally altered the forms of government
.. LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIEs: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CIZENSHIP 10 (1998) [hereinafter KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To
BE LADIES] (quoting from the New YorkJournaland GeneralAdvertiserand adding emphasis).
"2 Id. at 9.
'" THE DECLARATION OFINDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
... Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE at 369-71 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1963) [hereinafter ADAMS
CORRESPONDENCE].
"5 Letter from Abigail Adams toJohn Adams (June 17,1782), in 4 ADAMS CORRESPONDENCE,
supra note 144, at 328.
' THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3-29 (U.S. 1776).
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by dissolving the colonial legislatures;17 he refused to pass "the most
wholesome and necessary" laws for the public good unless the people
would "relinquish the right of representation in the legislature;, 4 8 he
obstructed the "administration of justice,"149 thereby destroying the
independence of the judiciary and removing trial by jury; he main-
tained a standing army in time of peace and rendered the military
independent of civilian control;.. he imposed a 'jurisdiction foreign
to our constitution,"151 and "taxes on us without our consent";152 he
suspended free trade between America and other parts of the
world; 53 and he waged war against his own people.
1 54
In his draft, Jefferson also excoriated the King for failing to re-
strain the "execrable commerce" of slavery.55 The South Carolinians
would have none of that, but the final text reads as though George III
was the oppressive slave-owner and white American men were
"slaves" to his tyranny.'56 Similarly, the Declaration of Independence
is also silent about the deprivations of liberty suffered by women as a
consequence of the English common law.
To dismiss the letters of Abigail Adams to her husband cited
above'57 as playful spousal discourse is to miss their full force in their
setting. At the core of the Declaration of Independence is an em-
phatic repudiation of the theory of virtual representation. For over a
"' 1d. at para. 23 ("For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested
with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.").
"' Id. at paras. 3, 5.
14 Id. at para. 9. See id. at para. 19 (depriving colony of "benefits of trial byjury").
"" Id. at paras. 12-13.
151 Id. at para. 14.
152 Id. at para. 18.
SId. at para. 17.
" Id. at par. 24 ("He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection,
and waging war against us.").
" Thomas Jefferson, Draft of The Declaration of Independence (1776), in 2 WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON 53 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1893); see alsoJOHN T. NOONAN,JR.,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, & WYfrHE AS MAKERS OF THE
MASKS 29-64 (1976) (discussing the role of Thomas Jefferson in tightening the restraints that
law made upon the slaves of Virginia-including his own slaves-in the post-Revolutionary pe-
riod).
6 Jefferson wrote of King George:
He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of
life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating &
carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their
transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the
warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where
Men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every
legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce: and that this as-
semblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished dye, he is now exciting those
very people to rise in arms against us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has de-
prived them by murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus paying
off former crime committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he
urges them to commit against the lives of another.
DRAFT OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 155 at 52-53.
*57 See supra notes 144-45.
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decade the Americans had been trying to tell the Crown and Parlia-
ment that virtual representation is to actual representation as, say, a
virtual hug is to the real thing. The argument over this point became
heated in 1765, when Parliament enacted the Stamp Act, requiring
the colonists to pay a tax on articles and other goods in commerce.
Massachusetts immediately called for a meeting to protest the tax. At
the Stamp Act Congress that fall, the delegates stated the American
position clearly: Parliament has no power to tax citizens who are not
represented in it.' 8 John Hancock wrote in 1768: "Taxes equally det-
rimental to the commercial interests of the Parent country and the
colonies are imposed upon the People, without their consent."'59 In
1766 Parliament repealed the Stamp Act, but enacted the Declaratory
Act, reaffirming the authority of Parliament over the colonies. In
1773 Parliament enacted a tax on imported tea, and that led to the
famous Boston Tea Party. The colonists kept trying to persuade the
King and Parliament to repeal the tax with humble and respectful pe-
titions, but these did not have a significant effect. The petitions were
never opened, let alone acted upon. John Hancock lamented: "The
decent, humble and truly loyal... Petitions from the Representatives
have been ineffectual [since] they have not reached the Royal Ear."
' 60
On this reading of the Declaration of Independence within its his-
torical context, it is not anachronistic to claim that male representa-
tives could no more adequately represent the experiences of women
than the members of the British Parliament could adequately repre-
sent the experiences of the Americans.
The next move for women was to petition for redress of griev-
ances, the very strategy employed by the Americans in the series of
unsuccessful communications with King George and Parliament be-
tween 1765 and 1776. On this side of the Atlantic, the right of peti-
tion was deeply imbedded in state constitutions and in practical ex-
perience, such as the public protests in 1785 against Patrick Henry's
proposal of a modest tax to pay for a teacher of Christian religion in
each town in Virginia. The right of petition was explicitly secured by
the First Congress through the First Amendment.6'
In 1804, Ann Alricks exercised her First Amendment right by peti-
tioning Congress for a divorce. 62  Married at age fifteen, she was
" EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION (1953).
" Letter from John HancockJosephJackson,John RuddockJohn Rowe & Samuel Pember-
ton as Selectmen of Boston, to the Selectmen of Petersham (Boston, Sept. 14, 1768).
I Id.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging.., the right of the
people... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
"' Petition to Congress, relninted in LANDMARK DOCUMENTS ON THE U.S. CONGRESS (Ray-
mond W. Smock ed., 1999). For a thoughtful discussion of the freedom to divorce in the set-
ting of the American revolution, see LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT &
IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 157-84 (1980) [hereinafter KERBER, WOMEN OF THE
REPUBLIC].
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separated from her husband "having lived very unhappily together"
for four years. The petitioner acknowledged that her pleas were not
among the "great national concerns," but laid them before Congress
as the only body with authority to end her hopeless marriage with a
husband who had abandoned her. Unlike the petitions sent by the
Americans to Westminster, this one elicited a response. The House
passed legislation granting to the courts of the District of Columbia
the power to grant divorces."'
Where divorce laws existed, they tipped in favor of men in almost
every important respect. Thus Elizabeth Cady Stanton could also in-
clude divorce law on her list of grievances in the Seneca Falls Decla-
ration of Sentiments:
He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper
causes, and in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the chil-
dren shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of
women-the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the su-
premacy of man, and giving all power into his hands.
As Professor Kerber notes, "[t]he rhetoric of revolution, which
emphasized the right to separate from dictatorial masters, implicitly
offered an ideological validation of divorce, though few in power
recognized it.'16
Petitions of women to all-male legislatures, however, were not
typically as effective as Ann Alricks'. On the contrary, legislatures in
which only men could serve, not surprisingly, illustrated the flaw of
virtual representation by enacting statutes that codified the common
law assumptions that kept married women "covered" by their hus-
bands, a quaint way of saying that men controlled the assets of their
wives. Courts on which only men could serve-on the bench, in the
bar, and in the jury box-solidified the notions of common law on
the rights of married women. The classic statement of this theme is
Blackstone's:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing;
and is therefore called in our law-[in] french, a feme-covert ... and her
condition during her marriage is called her coverture .... For this reason,
a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into covenant with her:
for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to cove-
nant with her, would be only to covenant with himself: and therefore it is
' Petition to Congress, supra note 162.
'"ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848), reprinted in MARY
BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINISTJURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 4
(1994) [hereinafter FEMINISTJURISPRUDENCE].
'65 KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 162, at 184.
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also generally true, that all compacts made between husband and wife,
when single, are voided by the intermarriage. 16
As Professor Kerber notes, "Long before constitutions were con-
structed as new social contracts, there were marriage contracts and
the complex system of subordination and authority which they were
understood to embody.
"167
This set of experiences led a bold group of women to decide that
they should take seriously the political theory of the Declaration.
Most of the leaders of the movement for women's franchise, such as
Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, and the
Grimk6 sisters, were also veterans of the Abolitionist Movement. Like
their ancestors in the pre-Revolutionary period, they knew the futility
of humble petitions to a deaf authority. Like their ancestors, partici-
pants in the Stamp Act Congress, the Continental Congress, and the
Constitutional Convention, these women called for an assembly.
When the leaders of the Women's Movement gathered at Seneca
Falls in 1848, they revisited the foundational document, the Declara-
tion of Independence, which they carefully edited, restating both its
central claims and its statement of facts. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the
primary drafter of the Declaration of Sentiments, revised the central
claim of equality to read that "all men and women are created
equal."" s She revised Jefferson's central claim about popular sover-
eignty so it stated that women may refuse allegiance to any form of
government that has become destructive of the ends of securing the
life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of the governed, from whose
consent the government derives its powers.69
Then, paralleling the structure of the Declaration of Independ-
ence, with its long list of grievances against King George, Stanton in-
cluded in the Declaration of Sentiments a carefully articulated history
of "repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward
woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyr-
. WILLIAz BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430, reprinted in SOURCES IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 70 (Michael Les Benedict ed., 1996). Benedict notes:
The rules Blackstone described as governing the legal status of married women re-
mained in force until the 1830s and 1840s, when state legislatures began to pass Married
Women's Property Acts, allowing wives to retain control of their property after marriage.
However, states did not begin to permit married women to retain control over their
earnings until the 1860s.
Id. I am unaware of any such law enacted before 1848, when New York enacted its statute in
direct response to the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, which included "coverture" in
the list of grievances: "He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. He has
taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns." ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET
AL, DECLARATION OF SENTIENTS (1848), reprinted in FEMINISTJURISPRUDENCE, supra note 164,
at 4.
'" KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES, supra note 141, at 11 (citing CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 48-49 (1988)).
... STANTON, supa note 164, at 3.
M Id.
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anny over her.' " If men could not see that the logic of the revised
Declaration drove toward full inclusion of women in the life of the
republic, women certainly did. The 1848 Declaration expressly in-
cludes the denial of fundamental political and civil liberties to
women in its list of grievances: "He has never permitted her to exer-
cise her inalienable right to the elective franchise.' 7 1 The conse-
quence of this deprivation of legal equality was to call into question
the legitimacy of coercive laws enacted under these arrangements:
He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she
had no voice .... Having deprived her of this first right of a citizen, the
elective franchise, thereby leaving her without representation in the halls
of legislation, he has oppressed her on all sides.
Neither Jefferson's draft nor the final version of the Declaration
of Independence listed the injuries that the common law of England
had perpetrated against women among the grievances lodged against
King George. Stanton and her colleagues corrected this lacuna, in-
cluding in the Seneca Falls Declaration a long statement of facts
culled from the legislation and court cases of the preceding decades
since the 1776 Declaration. "We the People" was now boldly ex-
panded to include women. The Seneca Falls Declaration of Senti-
ments did not win the day for gender justice in America, but it stated
facts, to a candid world, that women had already come to know-that
things had not gone well for women since the 1776 Declaration in all-
male legislatures and courts. The Declaration of Sentiments chal-
lenged the rational basis of excluding women from the franchise and
public service.
At each critical turning point in the debate over the social role of
women, women kept offering reasons for equality grounded in the
American political experience, only to be met with non-answers or
with specious reasons such as "the law of the Creator," given by Jus-
tice Bradley as the rationale for keeping women from admission to
the bar.7 3 Throughout their struggle, women offered another argu-
ment grounded in the founding period: "No taxation without repre-
sentation," a notion that had been a rallying cry for freedom from the
Stamp Act Congress. From Abigail Adams to Susan B. Anthony,
women pointed out that whatever else they were, they were certainly
taxpayers, yet were not represented in the sense that the law forbade
them to vote or to seek public office. As Stanton put it in the Decla-
ration of Sentiments: "After depriving her of all rights as a married
woman, if single, and the owner of property, he has taxed her to sup-




'" Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (BradleyJ., concurring).
[Vol. 4:2
CURIOUS CHIASMA
be made profitable to it" 174 This argument provided another ground
for challenging the reasonableness of laws governing women enacted
by legislatures from which they were systematically excluded.
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. Section 2 of
the text provides for a reduction in the representation of a state that
denies the right to vote to "any of the male inhabitants of such
State." 5 The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870. The text
provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."1 7  Noting
the silence of the text on the issue of disqualification on account of
sex, Susan B. Anthony pressed another argument for the enfran-
chisement of women. Her logic was as follows: only citizens can vote;
women clearly may be citizens of the United States since they could,
for example, hold a passport. Therefore, women can vote. Confi-
dent that her theory was sound, Anthony sought legal counsel from a
distinguished lawyer, who agreed with her interpretation that she had
a right to vote. Anthony presented her claim to the Inspector of Vot-
ers in Rochester, New York. He agreed with Anthony and signed her
onto the rolls. Along with ten other women, Anthony voted in the
1872 federal election.
The United States Attorney took a dimmer view of Anthony's the-
ory and convinced a grand jury to indict Anthony for election fraud,
charging that she "knowingly voted without having a lawful right to
vote."17 The testimony of the constitutional expert she consulted
clearly showed that Anthony had acted in good faith. Ward Hunt, a
Justice of the Supreme Court, presided at her trial. At the conclusion
of the evidence, he denied the motion to offer reasonable instruc-
tions to guide the jury's deliberations.17 ' Ruling that there were no
disputed facts for ajury to consider, he refused to submit the case to
the jury. Instead, Hunt directed a criminal verdict of guilty and in-
structed the clerk to enter that verdict, even refusing to let the jury be
"7 STANTON, supra note 166, at 4.
'"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
Id. amend. XV, § 1.
'"United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Gas. 829, 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459).
'"The requested instructions stated:
First. That if the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she had a right to vote,
and voted in good faith in that belief, she was not guilty of the offense charged. Second.
That in determining the question of whether she did or did not believe that she had a
right to vote, the jury might take into consideration as bearing upon that question, the
advice she received from the counsel to whom she applied. Third. That they might also
take into consideration as bearing upon the same question the fact that the inspectors
considered the question and came to the conclusion that she had the right to vote.
Fourth. That the jury had a right to find a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, as they
should believe that she had or had not been guilty of the offense described in the stat-
ute.
Petition of Susan B. Anthony for Remission of Fine for VotingJan 12. 1874, National Archives,
Records of the United States Senate, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. (SEN43A-H11.3).
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polled, the very thing that had caused the impeachment of Justice
Chase in 1804. 79 The behavior of Justice Hunt at the Anthony trial
was blatantly unconstitutional. He effectively blocked the people
from taking their rightful role in self-governance. Justice Hunt fined
Anthony $100 and refused to grant her wish for a prison sentence to
dramatize the injustice of the proceedings and the justice of the
cause of women's suffrage.
In 1874, Anthony petitioned Congress to pay her fine. Senator
Aaron Sargent, a California Republican, introduced a bill to do so,
but the bill was never voted out of committee. Anthony and her col-
leagues now developed a new strategy-a drive to amend the Consti-
tution to provide explicitly for women's suffrage. Women would have
to wait a half-century from the ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, which guaranteed the vote to newly emancipated black men, to
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
The trial of Susan B. Anthony serves as a bridge to other exclu-
sions of women addressed in this narrative, namely, exclusion of
women from the bar and from the jury. Would it have made a differ-
ence if women had been lawyers and judges at this moment in his-
tory? Would a mixed jury of men and women have allowed a Su-
preme Court Justice to abuse his office, or would they have objected
respectfully, in Thomas Jefferson's marvelous phrase, that "trials by
the people themselves, that is to say by jury"80 cannot be reconciled
with directed verdicts of guilt in criminal cases? Would they have
been willing to go to jail themselves-as the jurors in William Penn's
case in late seventeenth century London had done""-insisting that
the government may not deprive a fellow citizen or any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law? All these questions
are unanswerable, but they make vivid the sense of incompleteness in
our republic throughout the long period of our history when women
were precluded from voting and from serving on the bench, at the
bar, or in the jury box.
In the same year in which Anthony voted in New York, Myra
Bradwell urged the Court to grant her a license to practice law in Illi-
nois, regardless of the fact that she was a woman. Since other states
allowed women to be admitted to the bar, Bradwell argued that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired equal treatment in Illinois.'82 The Court rejected her theory.
Women would have to wait until each state decided to allow a Lady
Portia to grace the courts of law in its jurisdiction.
'' Anthony, 24 F. Gas. at 833.
... Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1879) (on file with the Ro-
senbach Museum and Library, Philadelphia, Pa.).
'8' SeeJohn P. Flaherty, William Penn, Lawgiver, THE PENNSYLVANIA LAWYER. Nov.-Dec. 2000, at
42, 43.
' Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
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Trial by jury is often referred to in rights discourse, but it is more
accurate to describe jury service as an obligation of citizenship.'8 The
fundamental constitutional principle at issue in this obligation is that
the people themselves are interposed between the government and
an individual whenever the government seeks to deprive her of lib-
erty through incarceration or take away her life in a capital case. 4
This constitutional guarantee, provided for in the Seventh Amend-
ment, is grounded deeply in the historical experience of the Ameri-
can people. As noted above, the Declaration of Independence in-
cluded a bill of particulars stating specific grievances against the
Crown. Among these tyrannical acts was "depriving us, in many
Cases, of the Benefits of Trial byJury.". The sudden expansion of
the jurisdiction of the Courts of Admiralty-which did not use a
jury-over criminal cases underlay this complaint, which led directly
to the provision of a right to trial by jury in all of the state constitu-
tions, and in the United States Constitution.
But who should serve on juries? When juries were first convened,
the answer to this question was clear-only men could represent the
people in the deliberative process of a trial. As recently as 1961 a
state in our republic maintained a rule presumptively favoring males
on juries. Florida did not prohibit women from serving, but it did
give women an automatic exemption from service. The Supreme
Court sustained that rule in Hoyt v. Florida.'6 AsJusticeJohn Marshall
Harlan put it, "Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from
the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to
men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.""8 7
For that reason, Harlan concluded, it is not "constitutionally imper-
missible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to con-
clude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury
service unless she herself determines that such service is consistent
with her own special responsibilities.""'
'" The central argument in KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES, supra note
141, is that the condition of women and of the republic generally would be improved by focus-
ing on the obligations of citizenship.
84 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The ChangingPlea BargainingDebate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652
(1981).
.' THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776).
.. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). For an excellent discussion of this case, see KERBER, No
CONSTITUToNAL RIGHT To BE LADIES, supra note 141, at 124-85.
' Hyt 368 U.S. at 61-62.
' Id. at 62.
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B. The Ascent to Rationality with a Bite: From Reed v. Reed
to Craig v. Boren
I mentioned Blaise Pascal's famous pens6e about the heart having
reasons of its own.9 When coupled with Holmes' observation about
the life of the law,"° it should be clear that the sort of rationality that I
am urging here is not coterminous with logic or ratiocination. I have
relied on stories about Madison to show how religious freedom was,
from the outset, central in American political thought. This narrative
is normative in the sense that it equips us with the tools to interrogate
the current stage of legal history in which free exercise is underval-
ued. I have interwoven stories of the exclusion of women from full
participation in American civic life to illustrate the jarring discrep-
ancy between the ideals emphasized at the foundation of the republic
and the actual experience of women throughout our history. Now
that the disharmony has been overcome, it would be irrational or un-
thinkable to reverse direction and go back to a day in which women
did not vote, could not stand for public office, could not serve on the
bench or at the bar or deliberate on juries.
All of the cases to which I now turn are from a different era, one
in which women have played a prominent role in shaping the dis-
course. I have in mind three women in particular: Pauli Murray,
Dorothy Kenyon, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Murray and Kenyon
were the pioneers.19' Their work provided the basis for Ginsburg's
later critical breakthroughs." In homage to the work of Murray and
Kenyon, Ginsburg added their names to the first brief that she filed
in her capacity as leader of the ACLU Women's Rights Project. Reed
v. Reed,19 one of Ginsburg's first cases, was a success. The case in-
volved an Idaho statute providing that where several qualified per-
sons were capable of administering an estate, "males must be pre-
ferred to females." In determining the constitutionality of the
statute, the Court considered whether there was a rational basis for
the gender distinction. Under the existing understanding of rational
basis, the state would have won. In a landmark advancement for
equal protection jurisprudence, however, the Reed Court paid atten-
tion to the rational in rational basis.
' See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 17 ("The life of the law has not been logic but experience.").
In 1947, Pauli Murray coined the term "Jane Crow" to describe the ways in which law sys-
tematically discriminated on the basis of gender. See KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To
BE LADIES, supra note 141, at 189. For a general description of Murray's work, see id. at 185-99.
Thirty years later, after a very full career as a civil rights lawyer, Murray became one of the first
female priests ordained in the Episcopal Church. Id. at 201.
" Ginsburg said of Murray: "It was much easier for us to do what we did .... [T] here were
a lot of things that were very hard for her." Id. at 201.
... 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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I imagine that the following exchange might have gone through
Ginsburg's mind as she was writing her brief. Ginsburg: "Why would
you say that men are always to be preferred over women as adminis-
trators of an estate if the predicate is that they are 'equally quali-
fied'"? State's Attorney: '"ell, it's just easier that way. It's conven-
ient to run a court system with fewer people in it." Ginsburg: "That
is not a reasonable justification, it's a preference without a reason.
You can't invoke mere administrative convenience to avoid making
individualized choices on the merits of competing claims."
Ginsburg managed to persuade the entire Court to treat the task
of judicial review in a gender discrimination case with much greater
care. ChiefJustice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members
of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily con-
troversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely
on the basis of sex. T9
In the next Supreme Court term, Ginsburg filed an amicus brief
on behalf of Sharron Frontiero, a member of the United States Air
Force, and her husband, who were suing the Secretary of Defense,
Elliot Richardson. The question presented in Frontiero v. Richardso' 9
was whether the equality aspect of due process guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment prohibited differential treatment of men and
women in the armed forces in procedures for obtaining increased
quarters allowance and medical and dental benefits. A husband
could secure benefits for his wife without showing that she was actu-
ally a "dependent," but to secure benefits for her husband, a wife had
to demonstrate that her husband was in fact "dependent" upon her
for more than half of his support.
Ginsburg urged the Court to treat gender-based discrimination of
this sort in the same way that racial discrimination was treated. She
urged that strict scrutiny should be the standard.96 Two years before
Frontiero, the government had defended against a claim that while the
Free Exercise Clause protected religiously-grounded opposition to
service in the Vietnam War, privileging pacifists over those who be-
lieved that some wars are justifiable was a violation of the nonestab-
lishment principle.97 In both cases, Solicitor General Irwin Griswold
presented administrative convenience as the basic rationale for the
.. Id. at 76-77.
' 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
" Brief of Amid Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 27-32, Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
"7 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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government's policies. Griswold won the selective conscientious ob-
jector case, but lost the Frontiero case eight to one."'
Four of the Justices-Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White-
agreed with Ginsburg that in legal discourse sex is a suspect classifica-
tion. In other words, "classifications based upon sex... are inher-
ently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scru-
tiny."199 Two of the members of this plurality, Justices Douglas and
White, never fully agreed with the proposition that gender discrimi-
nation was quite the same as racial discrimination. Justice Powell,
joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Blackmun, was unwilling to
defer to the legislature or the executive when they enacted gender-
based classifications. The Justices demanded to see credible proof
that the classification actually achieved legitimate legislative goals.
These Justices also made clear that a goal of administrative conven-
ience-where preferencing males over females might be easier than
making individualized determinations of similarly situated persons-
would not qualify as a legitimate goal, either for Idaho or for the Pen-
tagon.
Ginsburg did not always win in the Supreme Court. For example,
she represented Mel Kahn, a widower in Florida who challenged a
state statute that allowed a $500 property tax exemption for widows
but not for widowers. °° Justice Douglas found the rationale plausible.
For him, it was enough that a state tax law was "not arbitrary."
20'
Douglas invoked language reminiscent of the late 1930s when the
Court stopped invalidating New Deal statutes involving economic
regulation of one sort or another: "[The] courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bod-
ies, [which] are elected to pass laws."22 This test, if it is one, restates
the obvious. A statute is constitutional if it is not in conflict with the
Constitution. The critical aspect of this case was that a majority of the
Justices believed the rationale offered by the government for the ex-
emption: financial difficulties facing surviving wives are greater than
those facing surviving husbands. For the majority, Florida's differing
treatment of widows and widowers met the test set in Reed because it
rested "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation."" 3 Douglas distinguished
Frontiero on the ground that the Florida tax scheme was not under-
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 688.
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
" Id. at 355. The Court found "[a] state tax law is not arbitrary although it 'discriminate [s]
in favor of a certain class... if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or
difference in state policy,' not in conflict with the Federal Constitution." (quoting Allied Stores
of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,528 (1959)). Id.
Kahn, 416 U.S. at 356 n.10 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
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taken "solely for... administrative convenience,"20 4 but is "reasonably
designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial im-
pact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a dis-
proportionately heavy burden."2 5
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, echoed
Ginsburg's brief on three points. First, he challenged the over-broad
presumption that all widows are financially more needy and less ready
for the job market than men:
It may be that most widows have been occupied as housewife, mother,
and homemaker and are not immediately prepared for employment. But
there are many rich widows who need no largess from the State; many
others are highly trained and have held lucrative positions long before
the death of their husbands. At the same time, there are many widowers
who are needy and who are in more desperate financial straits and have
less access to the job market than many widows. Yet none of them quali-
fies for the exemption.2
Second, Brennan clung to his view in Frontiero that gender-based
classifications are suspect and require more justification than the
State offered:
I perceive no purpose served by the exemption other than to alleviate
current economic necessity, but the State extends the exemption to wid-
ows who do not need the help and denies it to widowers who do. It may
be administratively inconvenient to make individual determinations of
entitlement and to extend the exemption to needy men as well as needy
women, but administrative efficiency is not an adequate justification for
discriminations based purely on sex.
Third, Brennan rejected the view that the State is entitled to pre-
fer widows over widowers because their assumed need is rooted in
past and present economic discrimination against women. For him
this explanation was not credible:
[I]f the State's purpose was to compensate for past discrimination against
females, surely it would not have limited the exemption to women who
are widows. Moreover, even if past discrimination is considered to be the
criterion for current tax exemption, the State nevertheless ignores all
those widowers who have felt the effects of economic discrimination,
whether as a member of a racial group or as one of the many who cannot
escape the cycle of poverty. It seems to me that the State in this case is
merely conferring an economic benefit in the form of a tax exemption
and has not adeuately explained why women should be treated differ-
ently from men.
Id. at 355 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690).
" Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355.
Id. at 361 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 361 (citing Frontiero and Reed).
" Id. at 361-62.
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Brennan lost the battle but won the war when he went on to write
the opinion of the Court in Craig v. Boren.29 This case, which in-
volved a differential in age and gender for sale of "near beer" (3.2%
alcohol content) to women at eighteen years and to men at twenty-
one, became the vehicle for the momentous announcement that a
majority of the Justices had agreed on a new standard for evaluating
equal protection challenges to gender classifications. They "must
serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives. 2' 0 Applying this standard to
the facts of the case, the Court invalidated the Oklahoma statute,
finding the rationale offered in its support unpersuasive. The State
argued that the age-gender differential was justified because more
teen males are arrested for drunk driving than female teens. The
Court accepted for purposes of discussion that the objective underly-
ing the gender-based classification was the enhancement of traffic
safety, which surely counts as an "important governmental objective."
Justice Brennan did hint, however, that in future cases the Court
might inquire as to whether a government attorney were "[s] electing
a convenient, but false, post hoc rationalization."21'
Ginsburg did not persuade the Court to adopt strict scrutiny in
gender discrimination cases, but she moved the argument far enough
that the Court adopted a standard that is on its face more rigorous
than rational basis with a bite. Ginsburg did, however, set the stan-
dards and continued to litigate carefully to ensure that there were
enough precedents to keep judicial scrutiny of gender classifications
faithful to the task of demanding real justifications. For example,
Califano v. Goldfarb12 invalidated a social security provision that re-
quired husbands, but not wives, of deceased wage-earners to prove ac-
tual dependency to receive survivor benefits. The holding extended
easily from the principle that Ginsburg established in Frontiero. From
Ginsburg's perspective it also helped to value the contributions that
women make to the future well-being of their husbands who survive
them.
After Ginsburg had left her mark on this area of the law, the
Court's consciousness had risen to the point that it could readily re-
view gender classification in statutes where the text so obviously as-
sumed a male dominance in spousal relationships. For example, in
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, the Court invalidated a Louisiana state statute
that gave the husband unilateral disposition ofjointly owned property
because he was the "head and master"21 4 of the family. In Califano v.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
'" Id. at 197.
Id. at 200 n.7.
21 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
2's 450 U.S. 455,457 n.1 (1981).
"' See LA. Civ. CODE. ANN. art. 2404 (West 1974) (repealed 1981).
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Westcott,211 the Court disallowed a scheme for Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children only if the husband, not the wife, was unemployed.
One of the most important goals that Ginsburg set for the
Women's Rights Project was the overruling of Hoyt v. Florida.21 She
did not litigate Taylor v. Louisiana,2 7 which held that the Sixth
Amendment ight to trial by jury means that women may not be ex-
cluded from jury service, but she argued a very important class action
suit raising the same issue. In Healy v. Edwards, District Judge Alvin
Rubin, writing for a three-judge panel, held that the Court's ruling in
Hoyt was eroded by Reed and erased by Frontiero.2 9 He concluded:
"When today's vibrant principle is obviously in conflict with yester-
day's sterile precedent, trial courts need not follow the outgrown
dogma. Hence we consider that Hoyt is no longer binding.",
2
Shortly before becoming a Circuit Judge, Ginsburg argued Duren
v. Missouri42 ' which involved an African-American charged with crime
in a state in which women had multiple opportunities to claim ex-
emption from jury service. Taylor invalidated systems like those up-
held in Hoyt, which required women to opt into the jury system, giv-
ing female jurors an easy out. Ginsburg was on the Supreme Court
when it extended the rule against exclusion ofjurors from the delib-
erative process because of their race22 to doing so because of gen-
der.22 The net effect of these cases is that women are now regarded
as full participants in this vital aspect of American civic life.
... 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
236 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (holding that it was constitutional to try a woman, who was accused of
killing her husband, in front of an all-male jury where women were arbitrarily excluded from
jury service).
2" 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
"' 363 F. Supp 1110 (E.D. La. 1973).
211 Id. at 1113.
2 Id. at 1117. Chief Justice Burger was astonished that a lower court would undertake to
overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. In 1991, while Ginsburg was a CircuitJudge, she
stated in an interview she thought that "Rubin was such a good judge." KERBER, No
CONSITTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES, supra note 141, at 359 n.275. Now that she is a Justice,
her view on the advisability of lower court judges overruling "stale precedents" of the Supreme
Court has become more orthodox. See, eg, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 255 (1997) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (deferring to an earlier Supreme Court opinion invalidating a remedial
education program that sent public teachers into parochial schools).
2' 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that use of peremptory challenges by a
government attorney to exclude persons from jury because of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause). A Batson challenge consists of three steps. First, the defendant must make out a prima
facie case that peremptoryjury challenge was based on purposeful discrimination. Second, the
burden then shifts to the government to produce a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
challenge that is particular to the parties' case at hand. Third, the trial court decides whether
defendant has carried his burden and proved purposeful discrimination. See id- at 91-93.
2' J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude persons from jury because of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause).
Some lower courts are considering a further extension to a rule against exclusion ofjurors be-
cause of their religion. See, eg., United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2000) (as-
suming that Batson applies to religion-based peremptory challenges, prospective juror's familiar-
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C. The Highest Level of Concern: United States v. Virginia
Ginsburg, as a litigator, had urged the Court to adopt a rule re-
quiring judges to view gender-based classifications with the kind of
suspicion appropriate for race.n4 The Court declined to adopt her
suggestion in Frontiero v. Richardson. Years later, Justice Ginsburg
stated a compromise rule governing gender classifications herself in
United States v. Virginia.22 She did not mandate strict scrutiny, but ar-
ticulated a version of rationality that subjects the reasoning underly-
ing gender-based classifications to raised scrutiny. She expanded on
Craig v. Boren in United States v. Virginia:
To summarize the Court's current directions for cases for official classifi-
cation based on gender: focusing on the differential treatment or denial
of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must de-
termine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persuasive."
The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely upon the
State [which] ... must show at least that the classification serves "impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed" are "substantially related to these objectives" .... The justifica-
tion must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response
to litigation. And it must not rely upon overbroad generalizations about
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.
Observers like Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the
judgment, but declined to join the opinion of the Court,2 7 and Jus-
tice Scalia, who dissented in the VMI case, are probably satisfied with
this standard.2 s The dissatisfied observers are those who, like Justice
Ginsburg, have made a career of advocating that gender justice is an
imperative in our society. They were glad to win the VMI case, but
were disappointed that Justice Ginsburg didn't deliver what Professor
Ginsburg had advocated-a strict scrutiny standard that would end
specious claims about rational basis for the strange career of Jane
Crow once and for all.229 Perhaps gender rights activists do have
cause for complaint, but maybe Justice Ginsburg knows something
that Professor Ginsburg did not know. If Justice Ginsburg has ever
connected recent free exercise jurisprudence with the cases on which
ity with Jewish educational institutions, based on juror's status as rabbi, was a nondiscriminatory
explanation for Government's peremptory strike).
" For a classic study of segregation in America, see C. VANN WooDwARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OFJIM CROW (3d ed. 1974).
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
'2 Id. at 566 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Pauli Murray invented the term "Jane Crow" to describe the similarity of discrimination
against African-Americans and against women. As an African-American woman, Murray under-
stood both forms of discrimination. See KERBER, No CONSTITUTIoNAL RIGHT To BE LADIES, su-
pra note 141, at 193-94.
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she worked so diligently as a litigator, I would caution that it may be
illusory to place a lot of weight on the label that she used to describe
recent standards ofjudicial review.
I. RESOLVING CONFLICTS (IMAGINED AND REAL) BETWEEN FREE
EXERCISE AND GENDER EQUALrrY
A. Professor Becker's Proposal To Penalize Religions That Do Not
Ordain Women
Law professors frequently like to imagine a hypothetical world
within which to conduct thought experiments that test the limits of a
principle. For example, Professor Mary Becker posited a conflict be-
tween religious freedom and gender equality in which religious
communities that do not call women to their sacred ministry should
forfeit their status as tax-exempt organizations.2 Because Becker is
conducting a thought experiment, it is irrelevant to ask whether
Congress is likely to contemplate seriously, let alone enact, the re-
form contemplated by Becker. 2"
In Becker's view, "substantial subsidies from the government to
mostly patriarchal religious organizations" perpetuate women's sub-
ordinate status and therefore raise equal protection issues.2  She
wrote this before the Court's ruling in United States v. Virginia, which
required that courts reviewing an official classification based on gen-
der under equal protection analysis determine whether a proffered
justification is "exceedingly persuasive. " " For the VMI case to add
strength to Becker's argument, it would have to meet the state action
requirement, but to argue that religious organizations that enjoy the
benefit of tax-exempt status are state actors effectively means that no
religious organization can enjoy this benefit. This is a conclusion
that the Court has not reached in its cases deciding this issue under
the nonestablishment principle.' In short, her claim that churches
are state actors proves too much.
Becker argues that banning tax exemptions and postal subsidies
and the award of government contracts to religious organizations that
close leadership positions to women is a moderate change compared
"' Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of 'Rights'. A Bicentennial Perspective,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1992). See generally Patty Gerstenblith, Institutional Organizations and
Accountability, Religious Institutions as Nonprofit Entities: Issues of Access, Special Status, and
Accountability, Remarks to the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, NYU School of
Law (Oct. 14-15, 1993).
.. One commentator anticipated Becker's suggestion by several years, but concluded that it
is unrealistic to expect this development to occur. SeeJane Vandeventer Goldman, Taxing Sex
Discrimination: Revoking Tax Benefits of Organizations Which Discriminate on the Basis of Sex, 1976
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 641.
" Becker, supra note 230, at 454.
2 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
" See, eg, Walz v. Tax Comm'n of NewYork, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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to proscribing all religious subsidies or requiring state regulation of
religion to eliminate sexism. 35 According to Becker, this result is
compelled by Bob Jones University v. United States, 236 which stripped a
university of its tax-exempt status because of a religiously grounded
policy of student discipline forbidding interracial dating or mar-
riage.237 One of the rationales for the result in Bob Jones University is
that an organization claiming exemption under I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) is
governed by the law of charitable trusts and must accordingly not
maintain a purpose "contrary to public policy." ChiefJustice Burger
wrote:
[D] eterminations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters
with serious implications for the institutions affected; a declaration that a
given institution is not 'charitable' should be made only where there can
be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public
policy. But there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination
in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementaryjus-
tice."
The Court concluded that Bob Jones University did not meet the
public policy requirement, since its "racial policies violated the clearly
defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial
discrimination and, more specifically, the government policy against
subsidizing racial discrimination in education, public or private."23 9
There are at least three difficulties with Becker's reliance on Bob
Jones University. First, it equates racial discrimination with gender dis-
crimination, a move that may be desirable for many reasons, but one
that Professor Ginsburg was unable to persuade the Court to under-
take, and that Justice Ginsburg did not accomplish herself in VMI.
Second, even if the highest level of judicial review were obtained in
gender discrimination cases, Becker does the very thing that Gins-
burg cautioned against in VMI: over-generalizing the interest she ad-
vocates. Becker equates the general federal interest in eliminating
gender discrimination with the more particular interest, eliminating
restrictions on ordination to ministry in a religious community. The
second difficulty is linked to a third. Becker's proposal for eradicat-
ing gender discrimination leads in the direction of negating religious
freedom at its very core or center, the decision about those who are
240called to lead the community at prayer.
Perhaps Becker intends to be making in our period a claim simi-
lar to that of the nineteenth century feminists. For example, Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton included the following grievance in the Declara-
See Becker, supra note 230, at 485-86.
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
2' Becker, supra note 230, at 485-86.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592.
"' Id. at 582.
2'0 For an example of religious reasoning in support of ordination of women, see Sidney Cal-
lahan, Is Black White?, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 9, 1996, at 6-7.
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tion of Sentiments: "He allows her in Church, as well as State, but a
subordinate position claiming Apostolic authority for her exclusion
from the ministry, and, with some exceptions, from any public par-
ticipation in the affairs of the Church."" When Stanton made the
claim, though, she addressed each grievance to the community in-
flicting the injury. The complaint of the nineteenth-century feminists
about non-ordination of women may fairly be read as one addressed
to religious communities, and their complaint about the exclusion of
women from full citizenship as one addressed to the political com-
munities of the state and national governments.
This reading is fully consistent with the view of the Religion
Clause as a curbing of governmental power over religious communi-
ties and their various forms of ministry. It is also consistent with the
understanding of nonestablishment as a requirement that the gov-
ernment refrain from preferring one faith community over an-
other.4
At various points in the late twentieth century many religious
communities began calling women to full participation in the rabbin-
ate, the priesthood, and the ministry. Think, for example, of Reform
Judaism, the Episcopal Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America. Their fundamental reasons for doing so are
theological. To put the argument in its simplest form, the call to
service of the religious community is from God, and the synagogue or
the church no longer impedes the recognition that God calls women
to render this service to the religious community.
Other religious communities still decline to ordain women.
Think, for example, of Orthodox Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and
the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, which share fundamental theo-
logical reasons for declining to ordain women. To put the argument
in its simplest form, the call to service of the religious community is
from God, and the synagogue or the church cannot admit women to
this calling because a change on this point would be in radical dis-
continuity with their understandings of their sacred traditions about
what God wants.24 3 Even if controversy over this matter remains lively
2. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS, reprinted in FENMINISTJURISPRUDENCE, supra note 164, at 4.
2' See, eg., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding invalid a Minnesota statute that
favored certain religious groups).
, See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, On Reserving Priestly
Ordination to Men Alone (May 22, 1994) at http://wiv.vatican.va/holy-.father/johnpauUi/
apostletters/documents/hfjp-ii-apL22051994_ordinato-sacerdotalisen.html (justifying the
exclusion of women by referring to the interpreted witness of God). After some prominent
theologians challenged the characterization of this issue as settled, the Vatican's Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith issued another document, Response to Doubt about Ordinatio Sacerdo-
ta&is, on Oct. 28, 1995. In this document, Cardinal Ratzinger wrote:
This teaching requires definitive assent, since, founded on the written Word of God, and
from the beginning constantly preserved and applied in the Tradition of the Church, it
has been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium. Thus, in the pre-
sent circumstances, the Roman Pontiff, exercising his proper office of confirming the
Jan. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
within a particular community, the terms of the debate are typically
theological.2' Both arguments assume the importance of the teach-
ings or doctrines of a religious community as that which binds the
community together, but one argument leads to the conclusion that
the change in practice is continuous with the earlier teaching and the
other steadfastly maintains that the ordination of women would vio-
late traditions of such antiquity as to be unalterable without violating
the fidelity owed by the community to its founders.
brethren, has handed on this same teaching by a formal declaration, explicitly stating
what is to be held always, everywhere, and by all, as belonging to the deposit of the faith.
Response to Doubt About Ordinatio Sacerdotali. available at http://www.womenpriests.org/Church/
ratz_95a.htm (internal citations omitted).
'" For example, after the Vatican response referred to above in note 246, a leading Catholic
lay theologian at the University of Cambridge wrote:
Neither the Pope nor Cardinal Ratzinger can make a teaching to be "founded on the
written Word of God" simply by ascertaining that it is so founded. Nor can they by asser-
don, make it a matter that has been "constantly preserved and applied in the tradition of
the Church." The attempt to use the doctrine of infallibility, a doctrine intended to in-
dicate the grounds and character of Catholic confidence in official teaching, as a blunt
instrument to prevent the ripening of a question in the Catholic mind, is a scandalous
abuse of power, the most serious consequence of which will be further to undermine the
further authority which the Pope seeks to sustain.
Nicholas Lash, On Not InventingDoctrine, 249 THE TABLET 1544 (1995). Later in the month, a
Jesuit theologian who taught ecclesiology (the theology of the church) for decades at the Pon-
tifical Gregorian University in Rome wrote:
The question that remains is whether it is a clearly established fact that the bishops of
the Catholic Church are as convinced by those reasons [against women priests] as Pope
John Paul evidently is, and that, in exercising their proper role asjudges and teachers of
the faith, they have been unanimous in teaching that the exclusion of women from ordi-
nation to the priesthood is a divinely revealed truth to which all Catholics are obliged to
give a definitive assent of faith. Unless this is manifestly the case, I do not see how it can
be certain that this doctrine is taught infallibly by the ordinary and universal magiste-
rium.
Francis A. Sullivan, Room ForDoub 249 THE TABLET 1646 (1995). Sullivan later wrote:
The question whether a doctrine has been infallibly taught is not a matter of doctrine,
but a matter of fact, which has to be "manifestly established." What must be "manifestly
established" when the claim is made that a doctrine has been taught infallibly by the or-
dinary universal magisterium, is that not only the pope, but the whole body of Catholic
bishops as well, are proposing the same doctrine as one which the faithful are obliged to
hold in a definitive way. I do not see how it could be said that a papal declaration, of it-
self, without further evidence, would suffice to establish this fact.
Sullivan, 58 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 509, 513 (1997). Sullivan is the author of two books on the
Magisterium, or teaching office of the church. See MAGISTERIUM: TEACHING AUTHORITY IN THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH (1983) and CREATIVE FIDELITY: WEIGHING AND INTERPRETING DOCUMENTS
OF THE MAGISTERIUM (1996). On June 6, 1997, the general assembly of the Catholic Theologi-
cal Society of America endorsed the following resolution:
There are serious doubts regarding the nature of the authority of the teaching [that the
Church's lack of authority to ordain women to the priesthood is a truth that has been in-
fallibly taught and requires the definitive assent of the faithful], and its grounds in Tradi-
tion. There is serious, widespread disagreement on this question, not only among theo-
logians, but also within the larger community of the Church... It seems clear that
further study, discussion and prayer regarding this question by all the members of the
Church in accord with their particular gifts and vocations are necessary if the Church is
to be guided by the Spirit in remaining faithful to the authentic Tradition.
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The cases concerning the resolution of intra-church disputes are
not uniform in their treatment of local versus national churches.4
The confusion that has ensued after the most recent pronouncement
of the Court on this matter, Jones v. Wolf,246 should not distract reflec-
tive commentators from agreeing that secular courts are clearly for-
bidden by the Constitution from involving themselves in disputes that
would necessitate interretations of the Bible and of the canon law of
a religious community. Direct interference by the government in a
question of such religious delicacy would constitute the plainest ex-
ample of what the founders meant to prohibit when they forbade
governmental establishment of religion.2
B. The Place for Gay Rights Protest Against Religious Teaching on Homo-
sexuality: Street Theatre Inside a Church Building
I now offer not a hypothetical invented by a law professor, but an
actual event that illustrates the intense concern that sometimes
charges the atmosphere when religion is juxtaposed to claims of sex-
ual freedom. ACT UP!, an AIDS rights organization, passed out con-
doms at St. Patrick's Cathedral while Cardinal John O'Connor was
distributing the consecrated bread of the Eucharist to communicants
at a Sunday Mass on December 10, 1989. A religious community
might decide on religious grounds to suffer the indignity of this sort
of assault rather than invoke the power of the government to secure
its liberties.249 If it decides to call the police to protect its most sacred
liturgical moments from unwanted outsiders bent on disrupting its
communal prayer, a decent respect for the free exercise of religion
supports the removal of the protestors to the street, where such pro-
test belongs.
The New York Times not only reported the episode, ° it editorial-
ized against the form of this protest:
"' See, eg., Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Bishop & Diocese v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986); Primate & Bishops' Synod v. Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy
Resurrection, Inc., 636 N.E.2d 211 (Mass. 1994), cert. denieA 513 U.S. 1121 (1995); First Presby-
terian Church v. United Presbyterian Church, 464 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1037 (1984).
"6 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (holding in favor of the church majority in a dispute over church
property with hierarchical church organization).
247 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 164 N.E.2d 687 (N.Y. 1959); St.
Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 114 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1953).
"' See THomAS CURRY, THE END OF CHRISTENDOM (2001) (interpreting the motives behind
the separation of church and state in America).
24 See, eg., Matthew 5:38 ("Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right
cheek, turn the other also.").
SeeJason DeParle, 111 Held in St Patrick's AIDSP"otes4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989, atB3.
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There is plenty of room for controversy over church positions on homo-
sexuality, AIDS and abortion. No one can quarrel with a peaceful dem-
onstration outside St. Patrick's, andJohn Cardinal O'Connor did not do
so .... But some of the demonstrators turned honorable dissent into
dishonorable disruption .... Far from inspiring sympathy, such a viola-
tion mainly offers another reason to reject both the offensive protesters
and their ideas.25'
The Times did well to editorialize against the ACT UP! tantrum.
Like most angry messages, the message of this group was polyvalent.
At one level it represented rage at the exclusion suffered by gays and
lesbians because of their sexual orientation. It was also intended to
be an urgent statement that condoms should be part of a public
health policy to combat the spread of AIDS. Whatever the message of
the protestors, however, it could have been communicated less intru-
sively through leafleting on the public sidewalk outside the cathedral.
Protesters are, of course, free to voice their criticism of the religious
community on Fifth Avenue, a public forum where such speech may
not be censored by the government. In fact, that form of communi-
cation may have enhanced the probability of greater respect for the
message by the listeners. To enter the sacred space of a church in
order to desecrate it by a parody of Holy Communion does not just
go beyond the limits of protected free speech activity and invite con-
siderations of trespass. It goes far beyond the bounds of decency and
tears apart the common fabric of respect for religious liberty that
should undergird the relationships even among people who contend
with one another on public policy matters, whether on religious or
secular grounds.
Neither free exercise nor free speech is an absolute. Limits may
be placed on the exercise of both of these fundamental freedoms.
Precisely because they are fundamental, however, great care must be
taken before these freedoms are interfered with. As noted above,s
under the Sherbert rationale the reasons asserted for defeating a
claimed violation of free exercise may not be ordinary garden-variety
reasons, but must be compelling governmental interests. Similarly,
the Court has clarified that to overcome a claim arising under the
guarantees of freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, and petition
for redress of grievance, the government must do more than assert
the common good, loosely understood to protect the wishes of the
2" The Storming of St. Pat's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1989, at A24. Nearly two years later the same
group tried to bring its message to a national television audience through a documentary enti-
tled Stop the Church. PBS declined to support national distribution of the film because of what it
called a "pervasive tone of ridicule." Peter Steinfels, Channel 13 To Show Film on AIDS Protes
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at C24. Walter Goodman, the TV critic for the Times, wrote that the
film was a "nonstop diatribe against the Roman Catholic Church and John Cardinal
O'Connor." Walter Goodman, Prime Time vs. Art of Ridicule N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, § 2, at 21.
" See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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majority." That kind of calculus would have the devastating effect of
eliminating virtually all expression of unpopular views held by a mi-
nority. Instead, the government must ground its restriction of our
fragile civil liberties in requirements of the public order, not merely
in a majoritarian expression of the common good.
Once such powerful reasons have been established, reasonable re-
strictions may be placed on the time, place, and manner of commu-
nication.! For example, protesters can be arrested for invading the
"sacred" precincts of a courts- The sacrosanct editorial offices of a
newspaper cannot be breached to require the article to offer space to
a political enemy, even though that would expand the viewpoints ex-
pressed on matters of public concern.26
To return to the demonstration inside St. Patrick's Cathedral,
more than a trespass against property rights was implicated in the
episode. No one would miss this something extra beyond property
rights if neo-Nazis had desecrated ajewish cemetery by painting swas-
tikas or other contemptuous symbols on the stones marking the last
resting place of Holocaust survivors. By the same token, the ability of
all people to worship free from disruption is one worthy of protection
under the free exercise principle.
The problem with Professor Becker's proposal and the demon-
stration engaged in by ACT UP! is that there are no boundaries limit-
ing the outer reaches of the interests they seek to advance. Thomas
Hardy makes a similar point in his novel Far from the Madding Crowd.
A central figure in the story, a simple shepherd, loses his entire flock
because his dog, called George's son, did what he thought he was
supposed to do-run after sheep-but did it so thoroughly that all of
the sheep died. Hardy puts the story this way:
As far as could be learnt it appeared that the poor young dog, still under
the impression that since he was kept for running after sheep, the more
he ran after them the better, had at the end of his meal off the dead
lamb, which may have given him additional energy and spirits, collected
all the ewes into the corner, driven the timid creatures through the
hedge, across the upper field, and by main force of worrying had given
' homas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-32 (1945). Justice Brennan expressly relied upon
Thomas v. Collins in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
2' See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTmoNAL LAW 789-94 (2d ed. 1988) (cit-
ing and discussing leading cases).
.. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (allowing a peaceful demonstration on
the sidewalk adjacent to the Supreme Court, but not allowing demonstration inside the build-
ing). Not even Justice Black, a First Amendment absolutist, thought much of the rights of civil
rights demonstrators who took their protest too close for his Southern comfort to a courthouse.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581-84 (1965) (Black,J., dissenting).
4 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a statute that
granted a political candidate a right to equal newspaper space to reply to criticism under the
free press provision of the First Amendment).
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them momentum enough to break down a portion of the rotten railing,
257
and so hurled them over the edge.
Ever the Victorian moralist, Hardy concludes:
George's son had done his work so thoroughly that he was considered
too good a workman to live, and was, in fact, taken and tragically shot at
twelve o'clock that same day--another instance of the untoward fiate
which so often attends dogs and other philosophers who follow out a
train of reasoning to its logical conclusion and attempt perfectly consis-
tent conduct in a world made up so largely of compromise. M
I invoke Hardy's observation about compromise not to wag a fin-
ger at feminists and gays, but to highlight a broader principle that
applies to all of us. So let me turn the focus back to religious free-
dom. In a world made up so largely of compromise, perfectly consis-
tent conduct by the church or the state may be too much to expect.
Both the church and the state might do well to acknowledge the lim-
its of their power and to pursue their quests a little less enthusiasti-
cally than did the dog in Hardy's novel.
Religious believers must understand that it is too much to ask of
any society that religion would be an absolute trump against all claims
of the community for its ordered existence. No serious advocate of
religious freedom would espouse such a claim. For example, in the
Second Vatican Council, the bishops of the Catholic church stated
the central claim of their teaching on religious freedom as follows:
[A] ll men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or
of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters re-
ligious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own be-
liefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his
own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association
with others, within due limits .... Nor is the exercise of this right to be
impeded, provided that the just requirements of public order are observed.259
I conclude this section of the Article with a story of compromise,
one that might seem obvious, but one that was surprisingly hard to
come by. The case is unreported, but it is regrettably not a law school
hypothetical. In real life, protracted negotiations were unavailing,
and the church had to take a great city to court before a settlement
was reached. The conflict began with a demand by the Fire Depart-
ment of Anderson Township in Hamilton County, Ohio, issued to a
Catholic church demanding that the church refrain from the use of
hand-held candles at the Midnight Mass of their Christmas celebra-
tions. If obeyed by the church, the regulation would also impinge
upon the ritual celebration of the Easter services, at which some
Christians experience first darkness, followed by the piercing of
2 THOMAS HARDY, FAR FROM THE MADDING CROwD 41-42 (Harper & Row 1964) (1874).
2 Id at 42.
2 Paul Bishop, Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 678-80
(Walter Abbott ed., 1966) (emphasis added).
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darkness through the lighting of a fire (symbolizing the light that
penetrated darkness at the dawn of creation26 and the fire that
guided the people of Israel through the wilderness after their libera-
tion from slavery in Egypt 61), next the passing of a large candle (sym-
bolizing Christ as the Light of the World262), and finally the lighting
of smaller candles held by the members of the congregation (symbol-
izing the obligation of Christians to let their light shine before oth-
ers2 ). The biblical basis for this kind of ritual reenactment suggests
that churches with this sense of liturgical worship will not find it easy
to compromise with a government decree purporting to tell them
how to pray. The regulation would apply, of course, to all religious
communities with a high sense of liturgical celebration. Since not all
communities pray in this way, the regulation presented an issue un-
der both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.
At the outset of the negotiations the city asserted that its interest
in fire prevention trumped any other consideration. Christians were
free to pray or to sing at this service, but not to engage in conduct
(such as lighting the Paschal fire) that contained a severe risk to the
safety of the community. Note the exaggeration of the governmental
interest. What would Justice Ginsburg say of a similarly exaggerated
claim made by a government attorney defending a gender classifica-
tion after the VMI case? Would she and her colleagues on the Court
now take as strong a stand on exaggerated claims by government at-
torneys eager to defend a governmental regulation by inventing spe-
cious reasons or ad hoc justifications or by pretending that the regu-
lation was supremely necessary?
.- This symbolism draws from the creation narrative in the Bible:
In the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless
void and darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the
face of the waters. Then God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light. And God
saw that the light was good; and God separated the light from the darkness. God called
the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was
morning, the first day.
Genesis 1:1-5.
4 The Bible states:
The LORD went in front of them in a pillar of cloud by day, to lead them along the way,
and in a pillar of fire by night, to give them light, so that they might travel by day and by
night. Neither the pillar of cloud by day nor the pillar of fire by night left its place in
front of the people.
Exodus 13:21-22.
m See John 8:12 ("AgainJesus spoke to them, saying, 'I am the light of the world. Whoever
follows me will never walk in darkness but will have the light of life.'").
' This symbolism again draws from the Gospel:
You are the light of the world. A city built on a hill cannot be hid. No one after lighting
a lamp puts it under the bushel basket, but on the lampstand, and it gives light to all in
the house. In the same way, let your light shine before others, so that they may see your
good works and give glory to your Father in heaven.
Matthew 5:14-16.
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After Sherbert and Yoder this case should have been easy, not be-
cause the governmental interest in public safety was trivial or insig-
nificant, but because the government could easily have accommo-
dated or respected the concerns of the religious community while
safeguarding its own interest.26 That is the rationality of taking seri-
ously the least restrictive alternative standard I mentioned above in
Part I. Instead, the Ohio case dragged on and threatened to escalate
into a full-blown confrontation. Why? I offer two possible explana-
tions. First, Sherbert got government attorneys used to exaggerating
the nature of governmental interests (which they did in this case, by
pretending that a small controlled fire could burn the whole city)
and it may also have gotten church lawyers rusty at seeking the com-
mon ground. Second, Smith and Boerne withdrew from governmental
attorneys any serious incentive to identify common ground or to
reach reasonable compromises on matters that should not divide us.
To return to the facts in the Ohio case, my suggestion to the
church lawyers seeking my counsel was that the case did not involve a
stark either/or alternative, but instead had plenty of room for both
sides to get what they needed. I urged the church lawyers to keep
driving the government lawyers to the common ground, in the hope
that they could eventually see the point that a win-win solution was
desirable. Would it impress the authorities if the church took seri-
ously the Gospel injunction to walk a second mile with an adversary
compelling you to walk one mile? 65 Under these circumstances I
suppose that would mean not just having doors that can easily be
opened from the inside or installing fire extinguishers at decent in-
tervals throughout the church. It might also mean having a fireman
train the ushers in the use of such emergency equipment or equip-
ping the ushers with a cell phone that would be turned off during the
church service, but that would be available at a moment's notice in
the event of a fire that required emergency assistance summoned
through a 911 call, or perhaps through the direct dial number to the
local fire stations in the vicinity of the church. It cannot mean, how-
ever, allowing municipal authorities to tell Lutherans, Catholics,
Episcopalians and other liturgical Christians that celebrating the
spark of light piercing the darkness in the way they have been doing
for centuries-by lighting a fire-is a violation of neutral, generally
applicable laws governing public safety. When pressed to that kind of
obedience, the church might fortify itself by remembering the teach-
ing ofJesus that they should not give to Caesar what belongs to God,
even if Caesar demands it.
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See generally Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (argu-
ing ways that government can accommodate religion consistent with the Constitution).
* "And if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile." Matthew 5:41.
.. See Mark 12:13-17 (recitingJesus' statement to give to the emperor what is the emperor's
and to God what is God's). This speech occurs at the end of a story meant to trap Jesus into a
(Vol. 4:2
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The likelihood that government attorneys would give up their ex-
cessive demands upon hearing a sermon on this text is slim. Perhaps
the only word that would be communicative under such circum-
stances is the one famously uttered by Colonel McAuliffe when the
Nazis demanded that he surrender his troops in an engagement dur-
ing World War II: "NUTS!"267 That single word, of course, contains
the hope of this Symposium-that by identifying the irrational we
might secure our liberties.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CURIOSITY OF THE CHIASMA
Part I of this Article illustrated the shift from strict scrutiny of
claimed violations of free exercise of religion to toothless rationality
or worse, to utter irrationality. Part II illustrated the shift in the ad-
judication of claims of gender discrimination from this toothless ra-
tionality or utter irrationality to what I will call "de facto strict scru-
tiny."
I conclude that these cross-shifts are curious. Although religious
freedom has the older claim to protection in the Constitution, gen-
der equality is no less worthy of strong constitutional support merely
because the struggle to achieve this support is more recent. Both
struggles were protracted and secured values fundamental to the
American constitutional order. Religious freedom and gender equal-
ity merit the highest level of protection by constitutional actors in our
republic. The chiasma in rising and falling trajectories of constitu-
tional care about religion and gender is not normative, but curiously
irrational.
Any other conclusion strikes me as deeply problematic. The rea-
sons offered in support of reduced concern about governmental vio-
lation of religious freedom cannot be reconciled with a fair reading
of the text of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or with the his-
tory surrounding the adoption of these provisions. The fear that vig-
orous protection of free exercise entails "anarchy""' is just that-a
denial of Roman power over Jews. The question of financial tribute by believers to the state-
the exact reverse of the American question of financial support by the state for believers-is cru-
cial. Jesus' answer is on the surface neutral, but it is structured so that the emphasis is on giving
what is God's to God. SeeJ. DUNCAN M. DERRErT, LAW IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 313-38 (1970)
(discussing implications ofJesus' statement);J. Duncan M. Derrett, Luke's Perspective on Tribute to
Caesar, in POLITICAL ISSUES IN LUKE-ACTs 38-48. (Richard J. Cassidy & Philip J. Scharper eds.,
1983).
Probably the most famous line of World War ii history was written in December 1944, by
Anthony McAuliffe, the acting Commander of the 101st Airborne Division and other attached
troops during the siege of Bastogne, Belgium. When the Germans surrounded this unit and
demanded its surrender, McAuliffe sent back a one-word reply: "NUTS." Obituary of Anthony
McAuliffe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1975, at 34.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888. For a careful refuta-
tion of the role of anarchy in resolving free exercise conflicts, see CATHARINE COOKSON,
REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (2001).
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fear that is irrational and unsupported by history in the decades that
followed the adoption of rigorous scrutiny in Sherbert. It was precisely
to protect the public order against anarchy that the Court advanced
the standards for reviewing claimed violations of free exercise in Sher-
bert.
The abandonment of that insistence upon serious public reasons
for burdening religious freedom was undertaken without rigorous
and defensible public reasoning. The rejection in Boerne of the effort
by the political branches to supply a remedy more effective than that
deemed necessary by the Court was little more than a blunt power
play arrogating to the judiciary alone the power to construe the Con-
stitution and to take steps that the legislative branch deems "neces-
sary and proper," words describing legislative, notjudicial authority.
29
As for the exaltation of gender equality over free exercise dis-
cussed in Part III, at least it can be said that the Court has not made
that blunder. Many members of our society, however, including dis-
tinguished scholars such as Professor Becker, have made precisely
that move in their arguments. More could be said about the nature
of this mistake, but I am content at this point to conclude that it
needs to be informed by other feminist writing that seeks to avoid the
zero-sum game approach latent within the insistence that gender
equality is more important than religious freedom. No matter what
one makes of the relative strength or weakness of arguments about
the limits of free exercise or gender equality in particular situations,
both religious freedom and gender equality deserve serious protec-
tion against official state action.
A good place to start in achieving that goal would be to take very
seriously the reasons offered by government attorneys in support of
policies and practices that tend to denigrate or devalue these funda-
mental aspects of the human good safeguarded by our constitutional
order. That is what I think the Constitution mandates. After decades
of watching judges and commentators play fast and loose with ration-
ality, I am less interested in the labels than in the actual protection of
our liberties. I do not much care if careful judicial review of govern-
mental policies is called rational basis with a bite, intermediate scru-
tiny, or strict scrutiny. When it comes to protecting religious freedom
and gender justice, it is a regrettable shirking of public duty when the
label "rational basis" is misused to allow shoddy reasoning to reign
triumphant. Such a posture is not rational at all; it is irrational. Such
a posture has no basis in the Constitution, which all public officials
have a sworn duty to support. It is unfounded in text, history, and
experience. When the phrase "rational basis" comes dangerously
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term-Fore-
word: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 120 (2000) (arguing that Congress
has the power to make laws having incidental effects on religion via the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
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close to results that are unprincipled and irrational, it is time for all
of us to reflect anew on the task of providing a seriously rational basis
for review of governmental policies.
